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NOTES
SIERRA CLUB: RATIONALIZING THE ROYALTY
EXCEPTION TO THE UNRELATED BUSINESS
INCOME TAX
JENNIFER ANNE SPIEGEL*
The obligationattached to a gift itself is not inert. Even when abandoned by
the giver, it stillforms a partof him. Through it he has a hold over the recipient ....
INTRODUCrION

Tax exemption is a subsidy that society confers on certain nonprofit

organizations. 2 There are many reasons for granting tax-exempt status to nonprofit organizations. 3 For example, nonprofit organizations
may be financially unable to fulfill their nonprofit objectives without
the subsidy that tax exemption provides.' Similarly, tax exemption
assists a nonprofit in performing a function that the government
* The author wishes to express her thanks to Professor Jeffrey M. Colon for his
encouragement and thoughtful comments.
1. Marcel Mauss, The Gift- Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies 9 (Ian Cunnsion trans., 1967).
2. A tax-exempt entity is synonymous with a nonprofit institution. The term
nonprofit, however, can be misleading. The designation "nonprofit" means that an
entity is prohibited from distributing its net earnings to the individuals who control
the entity, it does not imply that the entity may not earn a profit. Henry B.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 Yale L.J. 835, 838 (1980) [hereinafter
Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise]. Under § 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, a
trust that forms a qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan as well as organizations listed in § 501(c) and § 501(d) are exempt organizations. I.I.C.
§ 501(a)(1995). Examples of organizations qualifying for exemption under § 501(c)
are fraternal societies, recreation clubs, labor organizations, civic leagues, corporations organized to promote amateur sports or competition, and most importantly,
§ 501(c)(3) organizations, corporations organized exclusively for religious, charitable
or scientific purposes. Id. § 501(c). A § 501(c)(3) organization, a charitable organization, can be distinguished from other nonprofit or tax-exempt institutions. For example, a donor may generally deduct contributions made to a charitable organization
pursuant to § 170, but may not deduct contributions to other § 501(c) organizations.
See Tax-Exempt Organizations: Organization, Operation and Reporting Requirements, Tax Mgmt. (BNA), No. 464-3rd, at A-1 (July 13, 1992). Throughout the remainder of this Note, references to exempt organizations or nonprofits will include
charitable organizations.
3. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale LJ. 299, 304 (1976); Henry
Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom CorporateIncome Taxation, 91 Yale L. J. 54, 55 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Rationalefor Exemption]; Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise,supra note 2, at 843-45.
4. See Hansmann, Rationalefor Exemption, supra note 3, at 74; James T. Bennett, Unfair Competition and the UBIT, 41 Tax Notes 759, 762 (1988) ("Unless they
receive government subsidies, for-profit firms will not produce pure public goods because of the 'free rider' problem."); see also Hansmann,Nonprofit Enterprise,supra
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would otherwise be forced to undertake itself, such as health care or
aid to the poor.5 Moreover, tax exemption is an appropriate subsidy
because nonprofits, which are prohibited from distributing their profits to their owners, are more trustworthy providers of goods and services than are for-profits. 6 Finally, nonprofits confront social problems
using innovative approaches that, because of bureaucratic and political constraints, government would not be free to pursue.7 Whatever
the specific rationale for tax exemption may be, the public that confers a subsidy through tax exemption expects a service to society in
return for this subsidy. The unrelated business income tax ("UBIT")
ensures that tax exemption will be used to fulfill this expectation by
limiting the privilege of exemption to income derived from activities
related to a nonprofit organization's exempt purpose.8
Income is subject to UBIT9 where a nonprofit (1) engages in a
trade or business that (2) is regularly carried on and (3) is not substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose. 10 Exempt purposes encompass a large variety of objectives, including education,
Congress
health, scientific research, and professional association.
enacted UBIT, sections 511 through 514 of the Internal Revenue
note 2, at 848-49 (arguing that profit-seeking firms are not as trustworthy providers of
public goods as are nonprofits).
5. Hansmann, Rationalefor Exemption, supra note 3, at 66. Bittker and Rahdert
distinguish between two types of exempt organizations, "public service" organizations
and "mutual benefit" organizations. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 305-06.
Public service organizations include charitable organizations, educational institutions,
social welfare organizations, churches, and other religious organizations. Id. at 305.
Mutual benefit organizations, on the other hand, are formed primarily so that members may pursue their own objectives. Id. at 306. Mutual benefit organizations include social clubs, labor unions, and trade associations. Id. at 305-06.
6. According to Bennett:
When consumers find it difficult to judge a product's quality before purchasing it-as with health care, for instance-consumers are said to be at the
mercy of suppliers and the market is said to "fail." In such cases, profitseeking firms supposedly will take advantage of consumer ignorance and increase their profits by offering lower-quality and higher-priced goods and
services. Because of this tendency, nonprofits are widely held to be a more
appropriate vehicle for the provision of certain types of services.
Bennett, supra note 4, at 761; John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, Business Income of
Nonprofits and Competitive Advantage, 33 Tax Notes 747, 748 (1986). This lack of
reliability of for-profits has been described as "contract failure." With nonprofits
there is no "contract failure," because nonprofits "have no compelling requirement to
distribute profits to owners, and have less opportunity and incentive to 'exploit' consumers than for-profit firms." Id. (citation omitted).
7. Copeland & Rudney, supra note 6, at 749.
8. See I.R.C. §§ 511-513 (imposing a tax on revenue generated by activities unrelated to an exempt entity's exempt purpose).
9. Id. If the organization is a corporation, it will be subject to the corporate rate
of taxation under § 11 on any UBI. See id. § 511(a). If the exempt organization is a
trust, however, it will be subject to tax on any UBI at the rate applicable to taxable
trusts, namely § 1(e). See id. § 511(b).
10. See id. §§ 511-512.
11. See id. § 501(c).
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Code, to prevent nonprofit organizations from gaining any unfair
competitive advantage over for-profit organizations through the
higher after-tax profit margins that tax exemption creates.' 2
Congress did not impose this tax without exception, however. Congress carved out several exceptions to UBIT for those activities it
deemed to be "passive"-that is, those activities not tending to incite
competition between for-profit and non-profit organizations.' 3 One
example of passive income is royalty payments. This as well as the
other exceptions were rationalized on the same grounds as the UBIT
tax as a whole-to control competition between for-profit and nonprofit organizations.
The Tax Court's decision in Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner (Sierra Club II)14 has made it doubtful that the unfair competition rationale will remain a plausible justification for UBIT and its exceptions.
Even prior to this decision, it was questionable whether the prevailing
interpretation of the exceptions to UBIT could be reconciled with the
underlying rationale originally expressed by Congress for the UBIT
provisions. 15 The Sierra Club II decision will force commentators to
revisit the question
of whether a more sound justification for UBIT
6
may be offered.'
In Sierra Club II, the Tax Court held that the proceeds received by
the Sierra Club in exchange for the use of its logo on an affinity card
marketed by Chase Lincoln First Bank were not subject to UBIT, because the proceeds were royalties and thus fell within the passive income exception to UBIT.17 The decision, however, represents such
an expansive interpretation of the royalty exception to UBIT that the
12. See H.RL Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950), reprintedin 1950-2
C.B. 380, 408-09; S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st ong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1950), reprinted in
1950-2 C.E. 483, 504-06.
13. See S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B.
483, 506: "Dividends, interest, royalties, most rents, capital gains and losses, and similar items are excluded from the base of the tax on unrelated income because your
committee believes that they are 'passive' in character and are not likely to result in
serious competition for taxable businesses having similar income." (emphasis added).
14. No. 8650-91, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62 (Aug. 24, 1994).
15. See, eg., A.L. Spitzer, Reform of the UBIT An Open Letter to Congress, 43
Tax Notes 195, 197-98 (1989) (arguing that taxing royalty income derived from a nonprofit's rental of its name and logo would represent a "substantial policy shift" for
UBrT); Thomas A. Troyer, ChangingUBIT: Congress in the Workshop, 41 Tax Notes
1221, 1226 (1988) (suggesting that the elimination of unfair competition between forprofits and nonprofits falls "short of a complete justification" for UB1T).
16. At least one commentator has already raised this question. See Paul Streckfus,
Sierra Club: Latest Nail in the UBIT Coffin, Tax Notes Today 176-82, Sept. 7, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. But see Leonard J. Henzke, Jr. &
Vicki Robinson, Tax Court Holds That Card PaymentsAre Nontaxable Royalties, 6 J.
Tax'n Exempt Orgs. 132, 135 (1994) (emphasizing the positive aspects of the expansive interpretation of the royalty exception).
17. SierraClub II, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62, at *71 ("Such items are intangible
property, and... [s]uch consideration thus constitutes royalties within the meaning of
512(b)(2).-).
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exception threatens to swallow the rule. 18 As one commentator
noted, "We have just about reached the day when any tax attorney
who has a tax-exempt client paying unrelated business income tax
(UBIT) is probably guilty of malpractice."' 19
While the exception upon which the Tax Court relied in the Sierra
Club decision is only one narrow exception to the unrelated business
income tax, it has become an increasingly important one. Many nonprofit organizations have entered into similar endorsement arrangements over the past two years. Oregon State University, for example,
is currently challenging the Internal Revenue Service's (the "Service")
determination that proceeds received from an affinity arrangement
with United States National Bank of Oregon is taxable as unrelated
business income.20 Other universities engaged in similar programs
may find such arrangements are not worth continuing if the programs
will subject them to UBIT.21 The construction of the royalty exception will also affect other types of arrangements. For example, the
Arthritis Foundation is awaiting approval from the Service for the exemption of income from an arrangement whereby the Foundation endorses aspirin and other over-the-counter medicine marketed by the
Johnson & Johnson Foundation.22
This Note examines the application of the UBIT royalty exception
to name and logo licensing arrangements between nonprofit and forprofit organizations. Part I of this Note examines the legislative origins and purpose of the UBIT provisions and demonstrates how the
UBIT provisions typically have been applied by courts and the Service. Part II focusses on the application of the royalty exception, emphasizing the broad manner in which the Sierra Club II court
interpreted the royalty exception under section 512(b)(2) of the Code.
Part III discusses various academic criticisms of the legislative rationale for UBIT, concluding that the unfair competition rationale is no
longer a practicable objective for UBIT. Part IV assesses the expansive construction of the royalty exception in light of the broader goals
both of tax exemption in general and, more specifically, the goal of
the UBIT provisions. This part explains how a broad interpretation
allows nonprofits to rely on revenue generated by unrelated activities,
thus discouraging nonprofits from pursuing related activities more vigorously. This part also evaluates proposals that have been made to
reform UBIT and its exceptions.
18. See Streckfus, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. See Petitioner'sBrief in Oregon State Alumni Association Case, Tax Notes Today 251-25, Dec. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
21. Other universities offer similar credit cards: Fordham University, Brown University, and Columbia University, to name a few.
22. See Lee A. Sheppard, Aspirin and the Ultimate Tax Shelter, 64 Tax Notes 420,
420 (1994).
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This Note concludes that the elimination of unfair competition does
not provide the best rationale for UBIT, because there is no consensus among scholars and practitioners that exemption creates an unfair
competitive advantage. This Note suggests that accountability provides a better rationale for UBIT. By taxing a nonprofit on income
derived from unrelated activities, UBIT ensures that a nonprofit is
held accountable to the public for the subsidy it has conferred on the
nonprofit. Neither the current drafting of the royalty exception nor
the Tax Court's expansive interpretation of the royalty exception in
Sierra Club 11 furthers this goal. This Note proposes that the royalty
exception should be modified with a view to compelling nonprofits to
account for the manner in which they use the privilege of tax
exemption.
I.

UBIT AND ITS

HISTORY

Prior to the enactment of UBIT in 1950, nonprofits were subject to
more lenient treatment by the Service than they are today. Some nonprofits exploited their exemption from federal income tax laws by acquiring entities in the for-profit sector. The abusive behavior of
nonprofits under this lax regime explains in part the concerns that motivated the enactment of the UBIT provisions. Under the current
UBIT provisions, the Service no longer permits the exemption of all
unrelated business income earned by nonprofits.
A. Pre-1950 Treatment of Unrelated Business Activity of TaxExempt Organizations
Prior to 1950, the "destination of income" test governed the taxation of unrelated business income earned by exempt organizations.23
Under this test, any revenue used to further a tax-exempt purpose was
exempt, regardless of the activity from which the revenue derived.
24
The Supreme Court, in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,
applied the "destination of income" test to an exempt religious organization that owned property used to produce wine, chocolate, and
other luxury articles. The Court held that because the proceeds were
destined to support the religious order, they were properly exempted
from taxation. The Court concluded that "destination [is] the ultimate
23. The plain language of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code prior to
1950 required only that a nonprofit apply the income it earned to further an exempt
purpose in order for the organization to qualify for exemption. See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt
Organizations,81 Harv. L. Rev. 1280, 1280 (1968) [hereinafter Note, Macaroni Mo-

nopoly]; see also Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 75 Va. L. Rev. 605, 608 (1989) [hereinafter Hansmann, Unfair Competi-

tion]; Nathan Wirtschafter, Note, Fourth Quarter Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate Sponsorship Game, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1465, 1469 (1994).
24. 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
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test of exemption," and thus, all that mattered was that the income
was used to advance an exempt purpose.2
The destination of income test applied even to income earned indirectly by an exempt organization through a wholly owned for-profit
subsidiary. 26 If an exempt organization acquired a for-profit organization, the proceeds earned by the organization would also be exempt
provided they were destined to further an exempt purpose. Thus,
through acquisition of a for-profit organization, an exempt organization could effectively convert a taxable entity into an exempt one.27
Such converted entities were commonly referred to as "feeder" organizations, because the income earned by the for-profit was used to
"feed" the nonprofit.28
In Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner,29 the Second Circuit upheld the exempt status of feeder organizations.30 In Roche's Beach,
decedent Edward Roche had created a corporation through which another charitable foundation could manage and collect income from his
property after his death.31 The income-producing property consisted
mainly of a bathing beach business in Queens County, New York:
Roche's Beach, Inc. 3 2 Although Roche's Beach carried on no charitable activities, the court ruled that it fell within section 103(6), 33 which
granted exempt status to corporations "organized and operated exclusively for... charitable... purposes... no part of the net earnings of
'
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."
The court construed the "organized and operated exclusively" standard to permit the exemption of income earned by wholly owned forprofit corporations, reasoning that "[t]he destination of the income
[was] more significant than its source. ' 35 In his dissent, Judge
25. It at 581.
26. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951); Bittker &
Rahdert, supra note 3, at 317.
27. In fact, prior to 1969, a tax-exempt organization could effectively "sell" the use

of its tax exemption to an unrelated business. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S.
563 (1965). Section 514, enacted in 1969, precludes such a sale by extending UBIT to

passive income to the extent such income is derived from debt-financed property, the
use of which is not substantially related to the organization's exempt purpose. See
Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee UBIT Recommendations, Daily Tax Report
L-4, L-14 (June 24, 1988) [hereinafter UB1T Recommendations].
28. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 317.
29. 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
30. It.at 779; see also Lichter Found., Inc. v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431, 436-37 (6th Cir.
1957) (upholding exemption of income from masonry business destined to support
nonprofit organized for purpose of aiding needy students).
31. Roche's Beach, 96 F.2d at 776.
32. I. The revenue derived primarily from bathhouse, suit and towel rentals, refreshment sales, etc. Id. at 777.
33. Section 103(6) was the predecessor to § 501(c)(3). See Revenue Act of 1928,

§ 103(6).
34. Roche's Beach, 96 F.2d at 778 (quoting 26 U.S.C.A. § 103(6)) (alteration in
original).
35. Id.
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Learned Hand urged that, with limited exceptions, any income obtained by an exempt organization through the profit-making activities
of a subsidiary should be taxed.' Yet twelve years passed before
Hand's critique was codified through the enactment of the UBIT provisions. Until then, the "destination of income" test enabled exempt
organizations to pursue profit-making activities without jeopardizing
their exempt status.37

B. Enactment of the UBIT Provisions
The UBIT provisions were enacted as part of the Revenue Act of
1950 and imposed for the first time an income tax on the unrelated
business income of exempt organizations. 38 Congress enacted the
UBIT provisions in response to the successful exploitation of the
39
"destination of income" test by New York University Law School.
NYU had used its higher after-tax profit margins to acquire for-profit
companies whose activities were entirely unrelated to legal education.4 In C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner,"' the Service challenged
the exempt status of one of these companies, C.F. Mueller Co. 2 Because Mueller was a subsidiary of NYU, it did not pay a tax on its
profits,43 thereby enjoying a higher after-tax profit margin than other
rival macaroni companies.' This higher profit margin presumably allowed Mueller to reinvest and expand more rapidly."5
The higher profit margin also provided, however, an opportunity to
engage in predatory pricing and monopoly.4 7 Because nonprofits
pay no tax on their profits, given the same priced product offered in
36. ld. at 779.
37. See, e.g., Estate of Simpson v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 963, 966 (1943) (finding
nonprofit educational institution's rental of property did not jeopardize exempt status); Unity Sch. of Christianity v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 61, 70 (1926) (upholding
exemption of a religious corporation's earnings from publications and from an inn);
Sand Springs Home v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 198,217 (1927) (upholding exemption
of income from a greenhouse, cotton gin, and an electric generating plant).
38. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, 1950 U.S.C.C.S. (Predecessor of
U.S.C.C.A.N.) (64 StaL 906) 479.
39. See Wirtschafter, supra note 23, at 1469.
40. See id.By 1947, NYU Law School owned the Mueller Macaroni Company, a
leather company, a piston ring factory, and a chinaware manufacturing company. See
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan.
L. Rev. 1017, 1017 n.2 (1982).
41. 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
42. See id.at 121.

43. See id.

44. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1020; MacaroniMonopoly, supra note

23, at 1281 n.10; Wirtschafter, supra note 23, at 1469.
45. See Note, Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 23, at 1282.
46. See Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 539 (5th
Cir. 1982). Predatory pricing refers to a market participant's adjusting its price down-

ward to undersell its competitors and eventually drive competitors out of business.
See F. M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 450-51 (3d ed. 1990).
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the same market, nonprofits enjoy a higher after-tax profit margin
than competing for-profits. For example, if product A sells for $5 and
the cost of production is $4, a nonprofit earns and retains a $1 profit.
The for-profit, however, pays a tax at the rate of 35 % on the $1 profit
and thus retains a profit of only $.65 for every sale of product A. Because of this higher profit margin, nonprofits could potentially offer
the same goods and services as competing for-profits at a lower
price. 48 By underselling competing for-profits in this manner, nonprofits could drive for-profits out of business and monopolize a market.49 Thus, with the advantage of tax exemption, Mueller could
undersell its competitors while still maintaining the same profit margin as for-profit macaroni competitors previously had. Theoretically,
this advantage eventually would enable Mueller to monopolize the
macaroni market.50 Despite these concerns over unfair competition,
however, the court in C.F. Mueller followed Roche's Beach's interpretation of the destination of income test and upheld the tax-exempt
status of Mueller. 5'
Congress enacted UBIT to preclude the possibility of nonprofit
market monopolies similar to NYU's alleged macaroni monopoly. 5
The Senate discussed the House Bill for the proposed tax in the following terms:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of
section [501] organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free

47. See United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 837; DAV
I, 650 F.2d 1178, 1181 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Veterans Found. v. United States, 281 F.2d 912,
914 (10th Cir. 1960).
48. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1023; William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. Rev. 13, 65 (1972).
49. Prepared Statement of the YMCA of the USA Presented by Michael P.
Graves, President YMCA of Delaware, Subcommittee on Procurement, Taxation and
Tourism, House Small Business Committee, Federal News Service (June 16, 1994)
(discussing competition between for-profit athletic clubs and nonprofit YMCAS);
Michael S. Moriarity et al., Small Businesses and Nonprofits Continue Quarrel Over
UBIT Reform, 42 Tax Notes 1419, 1420 (1989) (discussing competition by nonprofit

YMCAs and noting "when those entities start providing racquetball and squash

courts and integrated fitness programs to a relatively small clientele, the 'community
service' aspect begins to fade").
50. See Note, MacaroniMonopoly, supra note 23, at 1281.
51. C.F. Mueller Co., 190 F.2d at 122.
52. See Note, Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 23, at 1281. See also Boris Bittker

& Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 103-9 (2d ed.
1989). During the Congressional debate preceding the enactment of UBIT, Representative Dingell admonished his colleagues that "[i]f something is not done.... the
macaroni monopoly will be in the hands of the universities." Hearings on Revenue
Revision of 1950 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.

579-80 (1950) (statement of Rep. Dingell), quoted in Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40,
at 1017.
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to expand operations, while their53competitors can expand only with
the profits remaining after taxes.
The same policy concerns over unfair competition also determined
which exceptions to UBIT were to be allowed:
Dividends, interest, royalties, most rents, capital gains and losses
and similar items are excluded from the base of the tax on unrelated
income because your committee believes that they are "passive" in
character and are not likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having similar income. s4
Thus, Congress created the royalty exception because a royalty was a
passive source of income and, therefore, was not likely to incite competition between for-profits and nonprofits. A passive source of income implies that the income derives not from the nonprofit's active
operation of a trade or business but rather from the return on a nonprofits's investment in a trade or business conducted by another entity. Therefore, to exempt royalty income would not undermine the
goal of eliminating unfair competition because the nonprofit does not
actively compete with a nonprofit to generate the income but passively receives a return on its investment.
C. The Mechanics of UBIT
Although the enactment of UBIT curtailed the ability of a nonprofit to derive income from business activities unrelated to its exempt purpose without paying a tax, the precise scope of the provisions
was uncertain. The Treasury Department has since issued a series of
detailed regulations 55 intended to guide the application of UBIT and
define the precise scope of the provisions. Following the step-by-step
analysis implemented through the UBIT provisions and these regulations reveals the difficulty of distinguishing between a nonprofit's taxable and nontaxable income.
1. Identifying Unrelated Business Income
The UBIT provisions and their corresponding regulations identify
unrelated business income through a three-step test. 6 A taxpayer applies this test before deciding whether it is necessary to submit a return to the Service documenting its unrelated income. Under step
one, the taxpayer determines whether its income derives from a trade
or business.5 7 Regulation section 1.513-1(b) specifies that "trade or
business" has the same meaning as in section 162 of the Internal Rev53. S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 504.
54. Id at 506.
55. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1-513-1 (as amended July 26, 1983).

56. See id.
57. See id.
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enue Code, 8 that is, "any activity carried on for the production of
income from the sale of goods or performance of services."5 9
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. American Bar Endowment6 further refined the meaning of "trade or business" in the
UBIT context. In this case, the Commissioner challenged the exemption of income derived from the Bar Endowment's offer of group insurance to its members. 6 1 Having conceded that the activity was both
unrelated and regularly carried on, the Bar Endowment argued that
its insurance services, offered through an agreement with a for-profit
insurance company, did not constitute a trade or business. 62 According to the definition applied by the Court, however, the service did
constitute a trade or business.6 3
The definition of trade or business adopted by the Court in American Bar Endowment focusses on the intent of the taxpayer.64 The
proper inquiry thus becomes whether the nonprofit entered into the
activity with the "dominant hope and intent of realizing a profit." 65
Applying this definition, the Court found that the Bar Endowment
had conducted the activity with the dominant hope of deriving profit,
and thus the proceeds were subject to UBIT.66 Courts since American
have consistently applied this definition in the UBIT
Bar Endowment
67
context.

Under the second step of the UBIT analysis, the taxpayer decides
whether it has "regularly carried on" the trade or business. 68 Generally, an activity is "regularly carried on" if it manifests "frequency and
continuity" and is "pursued in a manner, generally similar to comparable commercial activities of nonexempt organizations., 69 The Tenth
58. I.R.C. § 513(c) (1995). Section 162 allows deductions for a taxpayer's trade or
business expenses. See id.§ 162.
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended July 26, 1983).
60. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
61. See id.at 108.
62. See id. at 110.
63. See id. at 119. Courts have developed numerous tests to define a trade or
business for purposes of taxation. For example, prior to 1987, "carrying on a trade or
business" was often defined as "holding one's self out to others as engaged in the
selling of goods or services." I Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation
of Income Estates and Gifts 20-6 (2d ed. 1989) (citing Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S.
488, 499 (1940)). This definition was rejected in 1987, however, because it led to
counterintuitive conclusions such as the following: a taxpayer "working throughout
his life for a single employer is not engaged in a trade or business because he does not
hold himself out to serve all comers in the manner of a merchant, independent contractor, or professional person." Id. at 20-6 to 20-7.
64. See American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 110 n.1.
65. Id.(citing Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984)).
66. See id.at 116-19.
67. See, e.g., National Water Well Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75, 91-92
(1989) (applying profit motive test to determine whether marketing of insurance to
members of exempt business league constitutes a trade or business).
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1)(a) (as amended July 26, 1983).
69. Id.§ 1.513-1(c)(1).
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Circuit examined this step in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Commissioner.7 ° The court held that the income generated by the
NCAA through the sale of advertising space in the souvenir program
for its annual three-week long National Collegiate Basketball Championship was not subject to UBIT, because the activity was not "regularly carried on."71
Under the third and most problematic prong of the UBIT analysis,
the taxpayer determines whether the conduct of the trade or business
is "related" to the organization's exempt purpose.' Under Regulation section 1.513-1(d)(2), a trade or business is related to an exempt
purpose only if the relationship is a "substantial" one.' If the production or distribution of goods or the performance of services does not
contribute "importantly" to the execution of the exempt purpose, the
trade or business is not substantially related.74 The difficulty in determining what contributes "importantly" to the accomplishment of an
exempt purpose is apparent in the context of exempt organizations'
advertising activities.
75
For example, in United States v. American College of Physicians,
the Supreme Court considered whether advertisements for pharmaceutical and medical supplies appearing in a publication issued by the
American College of Physicians generated taxable unrelated business
income.76 The College is an exempt organization formed to "maintain
high standards in medical education and medical practice . . . encourage research,... and to foster measures for the prevention of
disease and for the improvement of public health."' Despite testimony that drug advertising performs a valuable function for doctors
by disseminating information on recent developments in drug manufacture, the Court determined that the advertising activities were not
70. 92 T.C. 456 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990), action on decision,
1991-015 (July 3, 1991).

71. 914 F.2d at 1426. For an analysis of recent trends in the application of UBIT
to corporate sponsorship of athletic events, see generally WVirtschafter, supra note 23.
According to the regulation followed by the court, Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i),
"regularly carried on" encompasses regularly conducted seasonal businesses, such as
the operation of a horse-racing track several weeks each year, because "such tracks
generally are open only during a particular season." National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 914 F.2d at 1421-22. "Regularly carried on" does not encompass, however, a
hospital auxiliary's operation of a sandwich stand for two weeks during a state fair.
See id. at 1421 (discussing examples provided in Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i)). The annual
basketball championship, the court concluded, was analogous to the sandwich stand
example and thus was not "regularly carried on." See id. at 1421-24.
72. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended July 26, 1983).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended July 26, 1983).
74. Id75. 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
76. See id. at 836.
77. 1d.
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substantially related to the College's avowed purpose of furthering
medical education.7"
The perspective from which the Court determined whether the activity was substantially related to the exempt purpose is significant.
According to the Court, the relatedness of the activity to the organization's exempt purpose is not to be determined from the perspective of
the subscribers, but rather from the perspective of the publishers.79
Thus, the real question was not whether the members benefitted from
the advertisements. Instead, the Court focussed on "whether the publishers of [the journal] have performed the advertising services in a
manner that -evinces an intention to use the advertisements for the
purpose of contributing to the educational value of the journal."8' 0
Having determined that the organization's primary motive was to
of
make a profit and not to educate, the Court found all three prongs
8
the UBIT analysis satisfied and the advertising income taxable. '
2. Identifying Exceptions to UBIT
Even if the three-part UBIT test has been satisfied, income may still
be exempt from taxation if it falls within one of the "modifications" or
exceptions to UBIT under section 512(b).82 Section 512(b) excludes
from UBIT income "all dividends, interest, payments with respect to
securities loans, 's3 rents from real and personal property,' as well as
all royalties.8 5 These terms are not self-defining, however, and they
raise ambiguities in many other areas of the Code as well. 6 Whether
an item falls within any of the exceptions provided under section
512(b) must be determined with reference to "all the facts and circumstances of each case." s Thus, it is necessary to determine whether an
item of income designated as a royalty is truly a royalty or something
else, such as compensation for services.
78. See id. at 847-50.
79. Id.at 848.
80. Id.; see also Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 538
(5th Cir. 1982) (noting that where the only relation to the exempt purpose is the
generation of income to further the exempt purpose, the relationship is insufficient to

qualify as "substantially related"); Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 822 F. Supp.
371, 376-78 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (discussing definition of substantially related in context
of insurance services offered to members of Bureau).

81. See American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. at 839-41, 849-50.
82. See I.R.C. § 512(b) (1995).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 391 (1949) (distinguishing
royalty payments from gains on sale of property for purposes of determining source
and taxation of income). In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter urged that the plain meaning of royalty should be applied and that fiscal considerations should not alter the
meaning of "royalty" to serve the government's interests. See id. at 409 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-i (as amended July 28, 1992).
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II. THE ROYALTY EXCEPrION

TO

UBIT

The Sierra Club II decision has stirred controversy over the interpretation of one of the exceptions to UBIT-the royalty exception.
The conventional notion of a royalty denotes a payment for the use of
intangible property. Thus, potentially, the royalty exception could exempt a significant amount of revenue made taxable through the UBIT
provisions. In the context of UBIT, the royalty exception has been
construed at times narrowly and, at other times, very broadly. The
Tax Court's interpretation of the royalty exception in Sierra Club 11
represents the most expansive interpretation of the royalty exception
thus far. The decision has only exacerbated the debate surrounding
the scope of the royalty exception, because the Sierra Club 11 court
failed to provide a coherent rationale for its expansive interpretation
of the royalty exception.
A. Defining a Royalty
The royalty exception covers "all royalties (including overriding
royalties) whether measured by production or by gross taxable income
from the property." 88 A classic example of royalty income is the proceeds generated by a patent license."9 Under a patent license, the patent holder grants the licensee the right to use or market the invention
in exchange for a payment, either lump sum or contingent, or a combination of both. The licensee then markets the invention without any
further involvement by the licensor. Because it is the licensee who
uses and markets products incorporating the patent, the licensor's participation in the generation of income from the patent is said to be
passive. 90
A royalty has traditionally been defined as payment for the use of
intangible property.91 An exempt organization's goodwill is one example of intangible property. Goodwill refers to the value of an entity
attributable to good customer relations or to a well respected business
name that results in greater than normal earning power.' A nonprofit's mailing list is a by-product of its goodwill. Thus, when a nonprofit licenses its mailing list, it licenses an intangible asset, the right
of access to the nonprofit's membership list.93 Therefore, payments
88. I.R.C. § 512(b)(2).
89. Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1189-90 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
[hereinafter DAV l].
90. See Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 944-45 (5th ed.

1987).
91. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter DAV II]; Win. J.Lemp Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 586 (1952).
92. See Black's Law Dictionary 694 (6th ed. 1990).
93. See Hopkins, supra note 90, at 945; Mark A. Turner, Marketing Charity Membership Lists: Clarifying a Clouded Issue, 67 Taxes 202, 204 (1989); Richard A.
Speizman & John R.Washlick, Mailing Lists Revisited. The DisabledAmerican Veterans in Tax Court, 47 Tax Notes 1377, 1377-78 (1990); Edward Gonzales & Charles
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made for the use of a nonprofit's mailing list should be excluded from
UBIT as royalty income.94
Courts have varied widely, however, in their application of the royalty exception. 95 Therefore, it is not self-evident that income from the
rental of intangible property is exempt. One court held that the royalty exception could be applied to exempt from taxable income revenue generated by the licensing of an exempt organization's name and
logo. 96 Another court, however, found that the royalty exception did
not extend to payments made for the use of an exempt organization's
mailing list, because the payments did not correspond to the types of
passive income enumerated in section 512(b).1 Thus courts have
failed to define the precise scope of the royalty exception.
B. Delineating the Scope of the Royalty Exception:
Revenue Ruling 81-178
Because the rental of mailing lists and other intangibles is common
between for-profits and nonprofits, the Service has attempted to clarify the tax treatment of such transactions. 98 Revenue Ruling 81-178
addresses the taxation of licensing agreements between a nonprofit
Barrett, Chapter I. UBIT Royalty Income and Mailing Lists, in Continuing Professional Education: Exempt Organizations: Technical Instruction Program 114 (1994).
94. See Wm. J. Lemp Brewing Co., 18 T.C. at 597 (holding retention of right of
approval over methods of brewing, advertising and marketing of beer not inconsistent
with royalty characterization of proceeds for licensing of beer formulae and trade
name).
95. Compare DAV I, 650 F.2d 1178, 1189-90 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (retaining distinction
between active and passive royalty income in rejecting application of royalty exclusion) with Sierra Club I, No. 8650-91, 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 202, at *10 (emphasizing that excludable royalty income is not limited to passive forms of income). The
Service also has varied widely in its application of the royalty exception. Compare
Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-09-002 (Oct. 23, 1992) (rejecting application of royalty exception
to advertising revenue) with Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-36-001 (Sept. 24, 1994) (finding royalty exception cannot be applied to exempt advertising revenue earned by nonprofit);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-49-024 (Sept. 15, 1993) (upholding exemption of income from nonprofit's marketing of insurance program through application of royalty exception);
Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-003 (Sept. 30, 1993) (recognizing exemption of income
earned by nonprofit through logo licensing to market cash/risk management funds
through application of royalty exception).
96. See Sierra Club II, No. 8650-91, 1994 Tax Ct. Lexis 62 (Aug. 24, 1994).
97. See DAV I, 650 F.2d at 1189-90.
98. Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135-37. A Revenue Ruling is an administrative
interpretation published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin for the guidance of taxpayers and Service personnel, but it is not entitled to deference by a court. Rev. Proc. 951, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9. A letter ruling is a written statement in response to a request by a
taxpayer issued by the Service interpreting and applying the tax laws to the taxpayer's
specific set of facts. Id. The Service also offers technical advice to its district offices in
the form of memoranda in response to any questions that arise in the interpretation
and application of tax laws, treaties, regulations or other precedents. Rev. Proc. 95-2,
1995-1 I.R.B. 64. Technical advice memoranda are often issued upon the examination
of a taxpayer's return or upon examination of a taxpayer's claim for refund. Id.
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and a for-profit for the use of the nonprofit's intangible rights. 9 The
Ruling exempts proceeds from the rental of an exempt organization's
trademark and similar intangible rights, such as a mailing list, through
the application of the royalty exception, but only where there are no
services offered in conjunction with the license."c° Where payments
received by the nonprofit are coupled with payment for personal appearances or for services provided by the nonprofit, such payments no
longer constitute royalties but instead constitute, in their entirety,
compensation for personal services.' 0 ' Although the Service uses the
provision of services to distinguish between active and passive royalties, this distinction does not have explicit support in either the plain
language or the legislative history of the statute.
Despite the distinction Revenue Ruling 81-178 draws between payment for intangible rights and payment for personal services, the Ruling permits an exempt organization to retain a right of quality control
over its own publications. This quality control would not indicate too
active a role on behalf of the exempt organization, because characterization of a payment as a royalty does not preclude an organization
from reserving the contractual right to approve the quality or style of
the licensed products or services.10° This quality allowance lends
some flexibility to the standard set out in the Ruling. It also introduces, however, new ambiguities, because there is no clear distinction between taxable compensation for services and nontaxable
payments for quality control activities performed in conjunction with
the licensing of an intangible asset.
C.

Towards a BroaderInterpretationof the Royalty Exception
Although Ruling 81-178 attempted to distinguish between purely
passive and nonpassive royalty arrangements and thus define the
scope of the royalty exception more precisely, the Service has applied
it inconsistently, 0 3 and courts have essentially ignored it." 4 To some
99. Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135-37.
100. See iL at 136.

101. See id. at 136-37. To preserve a portion of the proceeds as exempt income, a

license agreement could divide the proceeds generated by the licensing of the intangible asset into (1) the proceeds received for the use of the intangible right; and (2) the
proceeds received for the services offered in connection with the licensing. See Marlis
L. Carson, PractitionersOffer Advice for Avoiding UBIT on Mailing List, Affinity

Credit Card Income, Tax Notes Today 187-4, Sept. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File. In this manner, a portion of the income can properly be
qualified as royalty income. Most agreements have not been bifurcated in this manner, however, and the presence of personal services has permitted both courts and the
Service to characterize all of the income earned as compensation for personal
services.
102. See Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135, 136.

103. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-49-024 (Sept. 15, 1993) (finding income earned by nonprofit in exchange for promoting certain governmental self-insurance pools not subject to UBIT). But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-36-001 (Sept. 24, 1994) (finding
advertising revenue cannot qualify as royalty income).
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nonprofits, the Ruling signaled a sharp change in the Service's interpretation of permissible royalty income, exempting proceeds from the
sale of mailing lists and other intangible assets where previously they
had been taxed.
The Disabled American Veterans Society, for example, attempted
to argue that the Ruling significantly changed the scope of the royalty
exception.' 0 5 Prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 81-178, in Disabled American Veterans v. Commissioner (DAV 1),106 the Society had
challenged the Service's determination that the rental of its mailing
lists to certain for-profit organizations was subject to UBIT.' 0 7 Referring to the legislative history of the royalty exception, the Court of
Claims reasoned that the rentals did not correspond to the types of
"passive" income envisaged by section 512(b).1 8 By concluding that
the licensing of the list was not passive, the court also implied that the
activity would in fact incite competition, because Congress originally
defined passive income as income not likely to incite competition. 09
In Disabled American Veterans v. Commissioner (DAV 1),11° the
Society attempted to relitigate this same issue, arguing that the Ruling
reflected a dramatic change in the Service's position. The Society argued that collateral estoppel"' should not bar it from relitigating the
royalty issue because of a significant legal development: Revenue
Ruling 81-178. To ignore this change, the Society argued, "would con2
travene an overriding public policy and result in manifest injustice." 1
The Sixth Circuit conceded some change in the Service's attitude towards royalty income, but denied that the Ruling constituted a legal
development significant enough to prevent the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine. 1 3 The court consciously avoided determining whether royalty income was limited to "royalties that are 'passive'
in nature," thus avoiding stating what the proper role of the original
104. The Tax Court, however, has followed the rationale of the Ruling. See, e.g.,

National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 456, rev'd 914 F.2d 1417;

DAV II, 94 T.C. 60 (1990), rev'd on other grounds 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991).
105. DAV I, 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981); see also DAV II, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir.

1991).
106. 650 F.2d 1179 (Ct. Cl. 1981).

107. See id. at 1180-81.
108. See id.at 1189-90.
109. See id.
110. 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991).

111. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "[w]hen an issue of ultimate fact
has been determined by a valid judgment, that issue cannot be again litigated between
the same parties in future litigation." Black's Law Dictionary 261 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
112. DAV II, 942 F.2d at 313.
113. Id.at 314 (disagreeing with the Tax Court's remark that Revenue Ruling 81-

178 "'casts doubt on the soundness of the analysis that only income from passive
sources qualifies as royalties that are excluded from UBTI'" and leaving "open the
question as to whether a revenue ruling ever effects a significant enough change in the
'legal climate' to bar collateral estoppel" (citation omitted)).
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rationale for UBIT was in defining the scope of the royalty
exception." 4

In Sierra Club I, the Sierra Club also litigated a claim for royalty
treatment of proceeds from the rental of mailing lists." 5 In its decision, the Tax Court maintained the same position as it had in DAV II,
urging an unequivocal rejection of the traditional notion of royalties
as "passive sources" of income." 6 In addition, the court stated that
"[t]he 'activity' or 'passivity' of a taxpayer vis-a-vis its income-producing activities is not determinative of the issue of whether a particular
item of income is the type which Congress intended to exempt from
UBTL"

7

The court then concluded that the scope of the royalty ex-

ception is not limited to passive sources of income. Thus, the proceeds the Sierra Club earned from the rental of the mailing list
remained exempt from taxation. With this holding, the court made
explicit an expansive interpretation of the royalty exception."'
Sierra Club I" 9 also followed this expansive reading of the royalty
exclusion. In that case, the Tax Court applied a liberal interpretation
of the royalty exception and held that consideration received in exchange for the use of the Club's name and logo to endorse an affinity
card was exempt as payment for the use of intangible property. 2 0
Thus, because the Tax Court applied a broader definition of royalty, it
reached the opposite result in Sierra Club II than the Court of Claims
had reached in DAV L121
In 1986, Congress enacted section 513(h), which clarified the application of the royalty exception to the sale or exchange of mailing lists.
Section 513(h) modifies the definition of unrelated business income to
exclude from taxation proceeds generated by the exchange of names
and addresses of donors between nonprofit organizations, implying
that the exchange between nonprofits and for-profits remains subject
114. Id. at 315 n.4.

115. See Sierra Club I, No. 8650-91,1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 202 (May 10, 1993).
116. See id. at *10.

117. See id. at *17 (quoting Respondent's Memorandum).
118. See id. at *10 ("We rejected respondent's arguments that ... the term 'royalties' included only royalties from passive sources.").
119. No. 8650-91, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62, *58 (Aug. 24, 1994).

120. See id. at *71.
121. Despite this latter decision, the Tax Court did not concede any change in the
scope of the royalty exception when the Veterans Society attempted to relitigate its
royalty claim a third time. In Disabled American Veterans v. Commissioner, 68
T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (1994), the Society relied upon the Sierra Club II decision as an
indication of a significant legal development that should preclude the application of
the collateral estoppel doctrine. The court refused to acknowledge a substantial

change in legal climate, and the Society was thus barred by collateral estoppel from
relitigating its claim. See also Marlis L. Carson & Paul Streckfus, Would You Believe
DAV III?-Or, Once More Into the Royalties Fight, 64 Tax Notes 563, 564 (1994) (sum-

marizing Society's third attempt to litigate royalty issue).
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to UBIT. 1 Although section 513(h) resolves the specific question
raised by DAV I and DAV 11, the DAV litigation remains significant.
In DAV II, by explicitly avoiding comment on whether a distinction
exists between active and passive royalty income, the Sixth Circuit
123
flagged the controversy surrounding the active/passive distinction.
Because the active/passive distinction provides a direct link to the
original unfair competition rationale, the court also intimated that this
rationale rested on shaky ground. In Sierra Club I and Sierra Club HI,
the Tax Court definitively abandoned the active/passive distinction,
thereby severing any link to the original justification for the passive
income exception-the elimination of unfair competition between
nonprofits and for-profits. 24 Thus, although section 513(h) clarified
the taxation of the rental of mailing lists by tax-exempt organizations, 12 the proper standard by which excludable royalty income is
determined in other contexts, such as name and logo licensing, is less
certain than ever.

D. Sierra Club II
No standard articulated by the Service clearly characterizes the proceeds received by the nonprofit from the rental of its name and logo.
The Sierra Club 11126 decision represents the most significant development in the application of the royalty exception since the DAV litigation first began in 1981.127 In Sierra Club II, the Tax Court applied the
definition of royalty originally urged by the Tax Court in DAV II yet
ultimately rejected by the Sixth Circuit-payment for the use of intangible property."2 By adopting the conventional definition of royalty,
129
Sierra Club II sanctioned an expansive notion of royalty income.
The royalty income at issue in Sierra Club II derived from the Sierra
Club's endorsement of an affinity card piloted by the predecessor of
122. See I.R.C. § 513(h) (1986). In DAV II, the Sixth Circuit suggested that through
§ 513(h), "Congress was responding to the court of claims decision in DAV L" DAV
11, 942 F.2d at 317 (Martin, Jr., J. concurring); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 481, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 822 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 (Vol. 4) C.B. 822, and in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4910.
123. See DAV II, 942 F.2d at 315 n.4.
124. See Sierra Club L 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 202, *10-13 ; Sierra Club If, 1994
U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62, *58.

125. Section 513(h) does not exempt, however, the exchange of mailing lists between exempt and for-profit institutions. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-02-009 (Jan. 13,
1995) (finding exchange of mailing lists between nonprofit and for-profit subject to
UBIT); see also D. Benson Tesdahl, IRS Taxes Indirect Mailing List Rentals, 10 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 1427 (1994) (noting that the Service continues to take the position that income from rental of nonprofit mailing list to for-profits is subject to

UBnr).
126.
127.
128.
129.

No. 8650-91, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62 (Aug. 24, 1994).
See infra notes 128-58 and accompanying text.
See Sierra Club HI, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62, at *58.
Id. at *18.
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American Bancard Services."z Eventually, Chase Lincoln First Bank
N.A. became the participating financial institution in the arrangement.131 In the typical affinity arrangement, the affinity group enters
into a contract with the financial institution to issue credit cards to the
affinity group's members and supporters. 32 In exchange for encouraging members to use the cards, the financial institution pays the affinity group a percentage of the monthly sales volume generated by
purchases made with the card.133
The role of the affinity group may vary widely. Among the services
and activities the Sierra Club offered under its affinity agreement with
Chase, and which the Court found indicative of the Sierra Club's level
of participation, was "cooperation" with the financial institution on a
continuing basis "in the solicitation and encouragement of SC members to utilize the Services" provided by American Bancard Services. '3 The agreements also provided an option by which the Sierra
Club could "pay for the production and mailing costs associated with
direct mail or other solicitations to its members. 1 3 5 The royalties
schedule provided for an upwards adjustment in the event the Sierra
Club elected to pay any or all of these production costs.'36
Applying DAV 11"s definition of "royalty," the Tax Court found that
the payments received by the Sierra Club were properly characterized
as royalty income and thus exempt from taxation. 137 According to the
Tax Court, the agreements reflected nothing more than payment for
of a valuable intangible right, the Sierra Club name and
the use
logo.'3 8 The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that
the Sierra Club had become either a joint venturer with Chase in promoting the use of credit cards or39 a sole proprietor of a credit card
business with Chase as its agent.'
130. Id.
at *5-6.
131. Id at *6.
132. See id.
133. See idat *6. The Royalty Fee Schedule states the premium as one half of one
percent of the Total Cardholder Sales Volume. Id at *13-14.
134. Id at *7.
135. Id at *9.
136. Id at *9, *13.
137. Id at *19.
138. See id at *60.
139. See id at *56-57. The Service has pursued an agency analysis in the past.
Through an agency analysis, the Service has transformed the active/passive analysis.
Instead of isolating the role of the exempt organization to determine whether its role
is passive, the Service has begun to focus on the relationship between the nonprofit
and the for-profit. See, ag., Tech Adv. Mea. 94-36-001 (Sept. 24, 1994). In Technical
Advice Memorandum 94-36-001, the Service found that the level of participation of
the nonprofit in an advertising arrangement had risen to the level of an agency relationship. The specific factors upon which the Service based its agency finding were:
(1) the exempt organization controlled circulation of the journal; (2) the organization
determined the number of editions; and (3) the exempt organization determined
which persons or organizations were to receive the journal. Id If a for-profit is an
agent of the nonprofit and subject to the nonprofit's control, the nonprofit's role, by
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In assessing the relationship between the Sierra Club and Chase,
the court looked for any evidence of benefit and control that would
indicate an intent to form a joint venture. 40 The agreements allowed
the Sierra Club only contingent compensation, measured by total
cardholder sales volume, rather than any share in the net profits of the
program.' 4 1 Also, because there.was a floor established for the Sierra
Club's profit percentage, the Sierra Club did not share in the credit
risks. 142 With respect to any control exercised by the Sierra Club over
the credit card 4program,
the Sierra Club's role was limited to one of
"cooperation."' 3 Although in previous letter rulings the Service has
found mere cooperation sufficient to suggest an active role in generating advertising revenue,'"the Tax Court concluded that the requirement of "cooperation" on behalf of the Sierra Club signalled a low
level of participation. 4 '
Although the Sierra Club's written consent, which permitted the
use of its name and logo, might also suggest some level of control, this
consent indicated to the Tax Court nothing more than the sensible
safeguarding and preservation of the "worth of petitioner's good
name."'" The Tax Court rejected the idea that this consent represented a control access measure or that the Sierra Club's quality control put it in the business of marketing credit cards. 47 Therefore,
because no agency or partnership relation had been formed, the Tax
Court concluded that the payments fell easily within the scope of the
royalty exception. 4
definition, is active. Because the original reference to royalty income in the legislative
history implies a passive role for a nonprofit, it is apparent that if an agency relationship exists between the nonprofit and the for-profit, this relationship precludes characterization of advertising revenue as passive royalty income.
140. See Sierra Club 11, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62, at *31-33, *38-40.
141. See id. at *37. The court later noted that a "net profits (and loss) interest in
such efforts would indicate that petitioner shared in the risks and rewards of marketing." Id at *50. A gross profit interest, however, is not inconsistent with the characterization of proceeds as royalty. Id. at *51 (citing Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d
753, 755 (2d Cir. 1938)).
142. See id.
143. See id. at *40.
144. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-47-001 (Oct. 8, 1991) (relying upon contractual requirement to cooperate as evidence of active role of nonprofit in generating advertising revenue from journal related to nonprofit's organization); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9309-002 (Oct. 23, 1992).
145. See Sierra Club II, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62, at *42.
146. Id. at *65.
147. See id at *69. In addition, SC had chosen not to exercise its right to contribute
to the operating or development costs of the program, which may have changed the
nature of SC's participation. The mere existence of a provision allowing for increased
compensation in exchange for contributions to production costs of advertising would
signal an active role to the Service or to a court adhering to the distinction between
active and passive royalties. For example, in Technical Advice Memorandum 92-47001 even the unexercised rights of control provided in the agreement suggested too
active a role. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-47-001 (Oct. 8, 1991).
148. See Sierra Club II, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 62, at *71.
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This generous reading of the royalty exception in Sierra Club II,
however, is not consistent with prior letter rulings and technical advice
memoranda issued by the Service in connection with name and logo

licensing and underscores the continuing debate over the scope of the
royalty exception. 14 9 In the majority of its recent rulings, the Service
has concluded that payments for the use of a name and logo cannot be
considered royalty payments, because the services offered in connection with the license implicate an active role by the nonprofit. 50 The
Service has rarely reached the opposite conclusion. 51 Thus the Ser149. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-003 (Sept. 30, 1993). Commentators noted the
broadening scope of the royalties exclusion as applied to name and logo licensing well
before the Sierra Club. For example, John Copeland, former officer of Tax Analysis
for the Treasury Department, observed the following in 1991:
Another concern with the exclusion for royalties is that in many cases, such
as where the organization licenses the right to use its name or trademark, the
licensing agreement is in essence an endorsement of a commercial product.
We are concerned that the current broad scope of the passive income royalty
exception may permit organizations to avoid tax liability on activities that
the UBIT is intended to reach.
John Copeland, Some Suggestionsfor Revision of Tax-Exempt OrganizationRules, 51
Tax Notes 911, 915 (1991) (citation omitted).
150. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-40-001 (June 17, 1994) (finding advertising revenue
could not qualify as royalty income and was thus subject to UBIT); Tech. Adv. Mem.
93-21-005 (Feb. 23,1993) (finding that payments for the use of a nonprofit's name and
logo to endorse a credit card were inseparable from payments for services rendered
by nonprofit and thus could not constitute royalty income); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-16-045
(Jan. 28, 1993) (finding payment for use of name and logo to endorse insurance program could not constitute royalty income); Priv. Ltr. RuL 93-06-030 (Nov. 18, 1992)
(finding payments for use of logo inseparable from payments for use of mailing list
and therefore subject to UBIT); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,827 (Aug. 20, 1990)
(finding that "payments to exempt organizations for use of name and logo, although
denominated 'royalties'" are in fact compensation for services). But see Tech. Adv.
Mem. 94-36-001 (Sept. 24, 1994) (stating that publication of names may not be subject
to UBIT because publication does not necessarily constitute an advertisement); see
also Gen. Couns. Mer. 38,083 (Sept. 11, 1979) (finding that payments for the use of a
nonprofit's name and logo to endorse for-profit commercial activities were exempt for
UBIT as royalty income); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,416 (Feb. 14, 1978) (finding that a
"limited amount of business activity by an exempt organization does not automatically rule out characterization of income as royalty"); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,292 (Oct.
6, 1977) (finding endorsement income comes within the meaning of royalties under
§ 512(b)(2)).
151. In Technical Advice Memorandum 94-04-003, for example, a nonprofit educational organization entered into a licensing agreement with several cash/risk management funds, granting each the use of its name and logo to promote the funds' services.
The licensing agreement stated that the organization would not provide services. An
affidavit, however, confirmed that the nonprofit had reviewed financial documents for
the funds, reviewed payments to monitor compliance with the agreements, and consulted with the funds with respect to how and when the endorsements of the funds
should be marketed. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-003 (Sept. 30, 1993). Despite this
involvement in the marketing of the funds, the Service characterized the payments
received under the licensing agreements as royalty payments. See id.
This ruling was revoked by Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-004, but solely on the grounds
that the royalties derived from a controlled entity and thus the proceeds could not
qualify as royalties pursuant to § 512(b)(13). But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-21-005
(Feb. 23, 1993) (characterization of name and logo licensing agreement denied
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vice has adhered to a narrow construction of the royalty exception
while the Tax Court has insisted on a more expansive interpretation.
Some commentators have responded with alarm to the result
reached in Sierra Club 11.152 To some, the decision indicates that the
term "royalty" may now "be construed in almost any fashion."'1 53 The
real import of the decision, however, is that there is still no rationale
154
for UBIT upon which both courts and the Service consistently rely.
Prior to Sierra Club 11, the active/passive distinction suggested a
means to separate exempt royalties from taxable royalties. 155 In Sierra Club II, however, the Tax Court rejected the notion that the royalty exception was limited to passive forms of income. Instead, it
focussed on the relationship between the nonprofit and the for-profit,
concluding that where a partnership or agency relationship exists the
nonprofit loses the benefit of the royalty exception. This suggests that
a higher level of activity is necessary before a nonprofit's role in generating royalty income will subject it to UBIT. Thus, where an agency
relationship exists, the nonprofit is taxed as if it were engaged in a
trade or business. The trade or business concept, however, may be
just as awkward and artificial a means of distinguishing taxable and
nontaxable income of nonprofits as the active/passive distinction is.
although only service indicated was inclusion of endorsement messages in the forprofit's marketing materials).
152. See, e.g., Streckfus, supra note 16; see also Robert A. Wexler, Affinity Card
Income Was Royalty, Not UBI, 81 J. Tax'n 316 (1994) (summarizing holding of Sierra
Club II and commenting on expansive interpretation of royalty exception).
153. See Streckfus, supra note 16 ("[O]ne can ask why he has taken such a liberal
position in both his Sierra Club opinions. It may be that a statute with a thousand
loopholes deserves no respect."). This concern is exaggerated, because the royalty
exception has been construed broadly only in the context of name and logo licensing.
The exception still does not apply to proceeds from the sale of advertising. See, e.g.,
Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-09-002 (Oct. 23, 1992) (finding that a for-profit publisher was
acting as the nonprofit organization's agent, and thus denied the exclusion of advertising revenue as royalties).
154. See Marlis L. Carson, PractitionersOffer Advice for Avoiding UBIT on Mailing List, Affinity Credit CardIncome, Tax Notes Today 187-4, Sept. 22, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (noting that the National Water Well decision
provides the only clear example of the "type of involvement that will give rise to
UBIT").
155. A similar distinction exists for purposes of taxation of United States multinationals. Under § 954 of the Code, the United States taxation of royalty income
earned by foreign subsidiaries of United States multinationals depends on whether
the royalty income is active or passive. Where a foreign subsidiary actively markets
an intangible, the royalty income derived from the intangible is considered active royalty income. Active royalty income of the subsidiary is not foreign personal holding
company income, and consequently, not subject to current United States taxation.
Congress justified this exclusion on the grounds that a taxpayer cannot readily manipulate the source of income generated through an active business in an effort to avoid
taxation in the United States. A taxpayer can easily manipulate passive royalty income, however, by choosing "to invest liquid funds overseas in passive investments,
thereby eroding the U.S. income tax base." See Erik G. Nelson, Royalty Tax Committee's Testimony at FinanceHearingon Foreign Tax Proposals,Tax Notes Today 92-82,
April 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
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Furthermore, it is unclear what rationale the Tax Court was attempting to implement when it supplanted the active/passive distinction
with an agency analysis, thereby broadening the scope of the royalty
exception. It is unclear, for example, how a broad or narrow reading
of the exception furthers the original rationale of eliminating any unfair competition. Nor is it clear that courts have interpreted the royalty exception with a view to furthering this purpose.
As will be discussed in part IH, neither practitioners nor academics
agree over what is the best rationale for UBIT. Because there is no
consensus as to the proper objective of UBIT, application of the
UBIT provisions has led to inconsistent results. On the one hand, revenue from advertisements for medical equipment in a medical journal
is fully taxed, despite its educational function. 5 6 On the other hand,
according to Sierra Club II, proceeds received by a nonprofit for its
endorsement of a credit card is subject to no tax at all.151 Even if
preventing unfair competition were still the guiding rationale for application of the UBIT provisions, it could not explain these inconsistent results. Perhaps the unfairness in the present regime lies in the
lack of a uniform rationale for applying UBIT and its exceptions to
similar types of unrelated business income generated by nonprofits.15 8
156. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 128-58 and accompanying text. A nonprofit's rental of its
name or logo can be distinguished from the typical nonprofit advertising arrangement. In most advertising arrangements, the nonprofit initiates the agreement by
soliciting the advertisement from the for-profit. See William Lehrfeld, The Unfairness
Doctrine: Commercial Advertising Profits as Unrelated Business Income, 23 Tax Lawyer 349, 356-57 (1970). The nonprofit benefits primarily from the payments made by
the for-profit for the advertising space. The for-profit, in turn, benefits from the nonprofit's endorsement before a specialized group of consumers. On the other hand, the
nonprofit will not attract any of the for-profit's clientele merely because the for-profit
advertises in the nonprofit publication. The benefit of access to a new clientele runs
in only one direction in these licensing arrangements.
Under a logo licensing arrangement, however, the endorsement benefits are mutual. For example, a bank marketing an affinity card on which the logo of a nonprofit
appears may attract a broader clientele because of the nonprofit's endorsement. Similarly, the nonprofit benefits from the exposure of its name and logo to subscribers of
the bank's credit card who otherwise might not be aware of the nonprofit. More
importantly, the nonprofit benefits from the indirect contributions made by subscribers of the card each time the credit card is used.
It is arguable, however, that the difference between an advertisement and an endorsement does not warrant such dramatically different tax consequences. If one accepts the proposition that advertising revenue is nothing more than royalty income
from a for-profit publisher for the right to exploit the nonprofit's name in conjunction
with the publication of a journal, then advertising revenue differs little from endorsement revenue. Although the role of the Fraternal Order in generating advertising
revenue was too active to qualify as royalties in Fraternal Order of Police v. Commissioner, 833 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1987), the Tax Court was amenable to the argument
that advertising revenue constitutes royalty income. See Fraternal Order of Police v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 747, 758 (1986).
158. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 613 ("[P]roblems of unfair competition generally arise only in transitions from one tax regime to another
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ASSESSING TIE UNFAIR COMPETITION RATIONALE

Congress originally used the active/passive distinction to identify
passive income as income derived from activities that would not incite
competition between for-profits and nonprofits.' 59 By rejecting the
active/passive distinction, Sierra Club II implicitly rejected the unfair
competition rationale. In the wake of Sierra Club II courts may be
uncertain as to what the appropriate rationale for UBIT should be.
Since 1950, courts have derived their explanation for UBIT's objective
from the relatively unambiguous remarks contained in the legislative
record.' 60 Thus, courts that have adhered to the unfair competition
argument have had explicit support for their position. Those few
courts that have questioned the argument rest on shaky ground.
Although courts have generally deferred to the legislative record's
reference to unfair competition in asserting an objective for UBIT,
courts have not applied UBIT with a view to furthering this objective.
Academics, on the other hand, have examined and criticized the unfair competition rationale in a thorough and detailed fashion, but have
failed to develop an alternative rationale upon which courts and the
Service may rely. Thus, both courts and academics have contributed
to the demise of the unfair competition rationale, leaving no guiding
principle for the application of UBIT and its exceptions. A new and
more practicable rationale for UBIT may be crafted by reconciling the
conflicting views over the now defunct unfair competition rationale.
A.

Courts' Assessment of the Unfair Competition Rationale

The notion that an exempt organization's ability to engage inprofitmaking activities leads directly and necessarily to unfair competition
has been repeated so often that it is held by courts to be a fundamental tenet of tax jurisprudence.' 6' Courts have cited concerns over unfair competition in simplistic terms, explaining that, without being
subject to the corporate income tax, an exempt organization can exThis advantage
pand more rapidly and undersell its competitors.'
presumably enables a nonprofit to achieve a monopoly within an in-

because that is usually the only time at which substantial unforeseeable tax-induced

losses can arise.").
159. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
160. See United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 838 (1986);
Veterans Found. v. United States, 281 F.2d 912, 914 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Community Servs., Inc., 189 F.2d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 1951); J.E. & L.E. Mabee Found.,
Inc. v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 673, 677 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
161. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 320 ("Whether the fear of 'unfair competition' was rooted in reality or in fantasy, it carried the day.")
162. See infra note 164.
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dustry. 163 There is no evidence, however, that nonprofits have ever
behaved in this manner.'"
NYU Law School's successful implementation of the pre-UBIT
"destination of income" standard incited fears of monopoly.
Although a perfectly legal exercise of its investment strategies at that
time, NYU's alleged macaroni "monopoly"'' 1 has come to symbolize
the potential of a nonprofit to abuse its exempt status.'6 For example, one commentator responding to the Sierra Club decision conjured
up the NYU macaroni monopoly to express his renewed concerns
over unfair competition, 67 questioning: "[I]s there any doubt that
NYU could structure a business arrangement with Mueller Macaroni
that would result in nontaxable royalty income to NYU?!"'6
163. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. at 837 (1986); Louisiana Credit
Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525,539 (5th Cir. 1982); DAV 1, 650 F.2d at
1181; Veterans Found., 281 F.2d at 914; United States v. Community Servs., Inc., 189
F.2d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 1951).
164. One commentator has aptly illustrated why nonprofits are unlikely to behave
in this manner:.
It is apparent that A's absolute advantage over B declines proportionately as
prices are cut lower and lower. Of course it may be possible for A to maintain its price-cutting policy until B goes out of business, and then raise prices
again. But it will be a severe drain on A's financial resources so long as the
price war continues. And it seems unlikely that exempt institutions like universities and hospitals, which are clamoring for funds, will forego current
income on the risk that they can drive out a competitor after a lengthy price
war. No evidence was adduced before Congress to show price cutting on the
part of businesses owned by exempt institutions.
Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 Yale LJ. 851, 876
(1951).
165. No one has yet demonstrated that NYU's control over Mueller had any adverse effects on Mueller's primary noodle rival at the time, Ronzoni, or even on any
other less formidable competitors. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1020 (stating "it is obvious that the ultimate impact of N.Y.U.'s pasta activities was not felt by
the Ronzoni Company.").
166. See American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. at 837 ("The statute was enacted
in response to perceived abuses of the tax laws by tax-exempt organizations that engaged in profit making activities."); DAV I, 650 F.2d 1178, 1181 n.3 (Ct. CA. 1981)
(noting that the primary purpose for UBIT was to eliminate unfair competition and
that C.F. Mueller is the example cited the most often to demonstrate unfair competition); Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Etc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 270,272 (8th Cir.
1978); J.E. & L.E. Mabee Found. v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Okla.
1975) ("The purpose of the enactment of the 'unrelated business income' provisions
of the Code was to eliminate this 'unfair' competition on the part of the exempt
organizations.").
167. See, e.g., Streckfus, supra note 16 (discussing Tax Court's expansive interpretation of r6yalty exception in Sierra Club I1).
168. Streckfus, supra note 16. This reaction is extreme in light of the fact that
under the current UBIT provisions, a feeder organization's income could never be
excluded as royalty income. Under section 512(b)(13), if a nonprofit owns eighty percent or more of a for-profit company, any royalty income received for the for-profit
will be subject to UBIT, despite the royalty exception. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13); see
also Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-04-004 (Sept. 30, 1993). Section 512(b)(13) does not impose
a tax, however, on dividends paid by a controlled for-profit subsidiary. Also, there
are ways to circumvent § 512(b)(13). For example, the exempt organization may use
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Only a few courts have questioned whether elimination of unfair
1 69
competition truly motivated the enactment of the UBIT provisions.
In Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Etc. v. United States, for example,
the Eighth Circuit suggested an alternative motive for the provisions.
The issue in Clarence was whether income from bingo games conducted by the nonprofit taxpayer was subject to UBIT. 170 The taxpayer, a patriotic veterans organization, sought to introduce a test
whereby income earned by an exempt organization would be taxable
"only if the trade or business competes directly with a taxpaying entity."'' The court rejected the taxpayer's invitation to establish a
standard based on the competitive effects of the activity.' 72 The court
suggested that unfair competition was not the primary rationale for
UBIT173 and that UBIT had been intended to eliminate a perceived
loophole and broaden the tax base to generate more revenue for the
Korean war. 174 Drawing large inferences from President Truman's remarks concerning the need for more revenue,' 7 the court intimated
that Congress itself had alternative motivations for enacting the UBIT
provision when it remarked:
[The] Internal Revenue Service has ruled that activities which are
not conducted in competition with commercial activities of taxpaying organizations are nevertheless considered to be unrelated trade
or business176activities which are subject to the unrelated business income tax.
tiered subsidiaries to avoid direct ownership of the for-profit subsidiary making payments to the exempt parent. If the exempt parent owns 100% of a for-profit subsidiary that in turn owns 100% of a second-tier for-profit subsidiary, any payments made
by the second-tier for-profit will not be subject to tax under § 512(b)(13), because the
exempt parent does not have direct control over the second-tier for-profit. See TaxExempt Organizations: Organization, Operation and Reporting Requirements, Tax
Mgmt. (BNA) No. 464-3rd, at A-130 (July, 13, 1992).
169. See, e.g., Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Etc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 270
(8th Cir. 1978).
170. Id at 271.
171. Id
172. Id at 272-74. See also Fraternal Order of Police v. Commissioner, 833 F.2d 717,
722 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a finding of unfair competition as a prerequisite for the
imposition of UBIT).
173. See Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Etc., 580 F.2d at 272.
174. Id (citing President's Message to Congress, 96 Cong. Rec. 769, 771 (1950)).
But see Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 621-22 ("To be sure, the
UBIT itself yields few tax dollars, and probably always will no matter how it is reformed.") Hansmann also states that in 1986, tax revenue generated by UBIT was
only $53 million. Id at 622 n.47 (citation omitted); see also, Suzanne Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 40, at 1017 n.4 (emphasizing that very little income had been collected
through UBIT and citing a study finding that the revenue collected represented only
.05% of corporate income tax for the years 1976-1982).
175. See Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Etc., 580 F.2d at 272.
176. Id at 273 n.8 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 4026) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the court suggested that U'BIT was nothing more than an effort
to broaden the tax base.' 7
Despite Clarence, few courts have attempted to refute either Congress's original intent for enacting UBIT or the legitimacy of Congress's concern for unfair competition. 178 In his dissent in United
States v. American Bar Endowment, 79 however, Justice Stevens
claimed that there was absolutely no danger of unfair competition evidenced by the Bar Endowment's agreement to use a for-profit insurance agency to provide insurance for its members. 8° Conjuring up
the image of NYU's alleged macaroni monopoly, Justice Stevens
questioned whether the Bar Endowment's insurance activities created
any unfair competitive advantage:
The unrelated business income tax was passed to avoid a certain
kind of evil.... So you go back and look at what evil there is in the
market. What was Congress trying to do ...when the... tax was

passed, and
one comes to the frequently-asked question, "Who is
181
Ronzoni."'

Justice Stevens's insistence on concrete evidence of unfair competition
suggests that fears of unfair competition created by exempt organizations might be unfounded' 82 Notwithstanding these isolated voices of
skepticism, courts generally have deferred to fears of unfair competition in upholding the imposition of UBIT without any tangible evidence that the nonprofit adversely affected competition.as
B. Moving Beyond the Unfair Competition Argument. Academic
Criticism of the Unfair Competition Rationale
Most courts have accepted the elimination of unfair competition between exempt organizations and for-profits as a legitimate rationale
for UBIT.11 Several legal scholars have argued, however, that fears
177. See id.
at 272-73. Similarly, in Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States,
the court pointed out that Congress had purposes other than preventing unfair competition for enacting the UBIT provisions. Louisiana Credit Union League v. United
States, 693 F.2d 525, 540 (5th Cir. 1982). The court made much of the fact that, for
over 30 years, Congress had declined to make competition a prerequisite for taxation.
Id. at 541.
178. See, eg., United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986);
Fraternal Order of Police v. Commissioner, 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
Smith-Dodd Businessman's Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 620, 624 (1975) (noting that "unfair competition plays a relatively insignificant role in the application of
the amended unrelated business tax").
179. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
180. Id. at 121.

181. Id.
at 122 n.4 (quoting trial court's oral opinion).

182. See id. at 122.
183. See United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 838-39
(1986); Louisiana Credit Union League, 693 F.2d at 538-42; DAV I, 650 F.2d 1178,
1181 (Ct. CL 1981); Veterans Found. v. United States, 281 F.2d 912, 914 (10th Cir.
1960); United States v. Community Servs., 189 F.2d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 1951).
184. See supra note 166.
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of unfair competition are unfounded.' 85 Yet there is no consensus
over why these fears are unfounded. Although some argue that tax
exemption creates no significant competitive advantage and that the
UBIT provisions should be repealed, 86 others suggest that unfair
competition may exist but offers a poor rationale for UBIT. 1' The
academic criticisms of the rationale for UBIT suggest that concerns
over unfair competition probably are unfounded. Thus, if no alternative rationale for UBIT existed, it would be appropriate to repeal
UBIT. There are, however, other reasons for retaining UBIT, and an
alternative rationale for UBIT may be developed that would remove
UBIT from the center of a potentially unresolvable debate over
whether nonprofits compete unfairly with for-profits.
1. The Extreme View
At least one scholar has argued for the repeal of the UBIT provisions based strictly on an economic analysis. 8 According to Suzanne
Rose-Ackerman, 189 not only do fears of unfair competition offer a
poor rationale for UBIT and its exceptions, but the UBIT provisions
actually exacerbate any competitive advantage that an exempt organization might have over a for-profit. 90 Another scholar, William
Klein, 191 also argues that fears of unfair competition are un-

founded, g2 but suggests that Congress should alter the tax scheme
imposed on for-profit corporations instead of altering UBIT 93
Rose-Ackerman points out several analytical errors underlying the
unfair competition rationale for UBIT. First, commentators confuse
perceived unfair competitive advantage with the actual exercise of a
marketplace advantage in an unfair manner. 94 A for-profit company
may perceive that, because of a nonprofit's larger after-tax profit margin, a non-profit competitor is capable of underselling the for-profit,
185. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 320; Hansmann, Unfair Competition,
supra note 23, at 609-12; Klein, supra note 48, at 68; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40,
at 1036-39.
186. See, e.g, Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1022.
187. See, e.g., Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 634-35.
188. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1038. While the major scholarly contributions to this topic have come from law and economics scholars, this approach may
provide too narrow a perspective on such a broad policy question as is raised by the
rationale for the UBIT provisions. See Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast,39 Mercer L. Rev. 867 (1988) (arguing that law and economics
theory over-emphasizes rationality and ignores empathy).
189. Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Law and Political Science, Co-Director of Center for Studies in Law, Economics and Public Policy, Yale University.
190. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1037-38.
191. Professor Emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles.
192. See Klein, supra note 48, at 68 (commenting that "fears expressed by competitors are paranoid rather than rational").
193. Id. at 74.
194. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1020.
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and, thus, the for-profit deems the tax exemption unfair. 95 A nonprofit, however, will not necessarily use its higher profit margin to undersell its competitors.' 96 It is just as plausible that the nonprofit will
sell at the same price but use its tax exemption to retain a greater
percentage of its profits than will its competitors. 97 Tax exemption
creates only the potential for unfair competition. There is no concrete
evidence that nonprofits have used this potential to compete unfairly.
Furthermore, it is not "unfair" to subsidize a nonprofit when a nonprofit faces significant disadvantages in raising capital.' 98 Thus, RoseAckerman urges that a clearer notion of "fairness" be developed."w
Rose-Ackerman argues further that UBIT actually exacerbates the
potential competitive advantage created by exemption. Because
UBIT discourages nonprofits from engaging in unrelated activities, it
forces nonprofits to concentrate themselves in markets related to their
exempt purposes. Under these circumstances, one market may have
no nonprofit participants while others are overpopulated by nonprofits. The excessive entry 0 of nonprofits in one industry represents a
greater threat to competition within an industry than does predatory
pricing.20 ' If many nonprofits enter a market already adequately
served by for-profits, the effect on the market price in that industry
may be similar to that of predatory pricing. 202 As a result, the forprofits may want to leave the overpopulated market and enter a less
195. See id196. See id. The Treasury recognized in 1987 that this alleged unfair competitive
advantage may be nothing more than an unexercised advantage:
[A]lthough tax exemption may provide an organization with the ability to
underprice taxable competitors, the actual effect of the tax exemption on an
organization's commercial behavior is not clear. While some exempt organizations may price their goods and services at less than what the market will
bear, others may seek to maximize financial returns because of concerns
such as funding or expansion.
Copeland, supra note 149, at 917.
197. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1021 ("[N]onprofits are no more likely to
engage in predatory pricing than for-profits.")
198. While commentators continue to make claims of unfair competition, they do
not substantiate them with proof of underpricing. See, e.g., James T. Bennett &
Thomas J. Di Lorenzo, Unfair Competition: The Profits of Nonprofits (1988).
199. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1020. Using the NYU-Mueller scenario,
Rose-Ackerman points out:
The different tax treatment of competing organizational forms does not imply that Ronzoni and N.Y.U. would charge different prices for their macaroni or pay different wages to their workers. It implies only that N.Y.U.
would keep a larger share of Mueller's profits than would Ronzoni's owners
....
Why must a fair tax code treat students and scholars who are the
beneficiaries of Mueller's profits as if they were 'equal to' Ronzoni's

investors?

Id200. Excessive entry refers to a large concentration of participants in one particular
market. See id. at 1027 n.32.

201. See id. at 1026.
202. Id at 1026.
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densely populated market where they can enjoy a larger share of the
market. For-profits cannot, however, simply leave the first market
and apply their resources to a less saturated market.20 3 Once both
human and capital resources have been invested in one market, they
cannot readily be transferred to another.2° Instead, the prohibitive
cost of exiting an industry forces a for-profit to remain in a market
and attempt to compete with nonprofits, which are capable of offering
goods at a lower price.20 5 Consequently, the for-profit will earn lower
profits than it had before the nonprofits' excessive entry.2° Thus, the
market price will be adversely affected whenever it becomes advantageous for non-profits to concentrate themselves within a particular industry. According to Rose-Ackerman, it is precisely this incentive for
concentration that the UBIT provisions create, rather than prevent:
"Tax-exempt firms must now concentrate their profitable endeavors in
those few lines of business judged to be 'related.' 20
A second argument advanced by for-profits supporting the unfair
competition rationale is that tax exemption immunizes nonprofits
from the risk of bankruptcy. 208 They argue that, because of tax exemption, nonprofits will expand and accumulate earnings more
quickly, and thus will be less vulnerable to bankruptcy.209 Rose-Ackerman claims that this argument oversimplifies the risk of bankruptcy.2 10 In addition to accumulated earnings, the ability to carry
over losses will also determine a corporation's solvency. 211 A corporation can generally only use losses to the extent that the corporation
has taxable income (not including the losses) in the current year.2 2 If
a corporation's ability to recognize its losses is limited to the year in
which they are incurred, it may lose the benefit of offsetting taxable
income in subsequent or prior years. If, however, the corporation is
allowed to carry these losses forward to future years, it can take a loss
from year one and use it to offset any taxable income earned in the
next fifteen years or backwards to the prior year. 13 Thus, although
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id
See id.
Id.
1& Rose-Ackerman suggests that "excessive" entry will occur "when nonprof-

its have excess cash to invest and the return they can obtain by lending their money
on the bond market is lower than the rate of return on active, entrepreneurial investments." Id. at 1027-28.
207. I& at 1038. Rose-Ackerman suggests that such concentration has already developed in gift shop and vacation tour industries. I&a

208. See id. at 1035.
209. See id. at 1034-35.
210. See id.at 1035.
211. See id.
212. See I.R.C. § 172 (1995).
213. See id. See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1035. Because of the relatively generous provisions concerning carryovers, according to Rose-Ackerman:
For-profits will only be disadvantaged when they have a run of losses that
lasts more than eighteen years with major losses in the middle of the pe-
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exemption may enable a nonprofit to accumulate earnings more rapidly than a for-profit, this ability alone will not insulate it from bankruptcy. 214 Because the ability to carry over losses, an ability shared by
nonprofits and for-profits alike, will minimize the advantage of a nonprofit in maintaining higher profit margins, exemption does not give
nonprofits any
disproportionate advantage with respect to avoiding
215
bankruptcy.
While the potential for an unfair competitive advantage of nonprofits over for-profits may not be illusory, it may occur in a manner different than is generally understood by for-profits complaining of
unfair competition, namely through excessive concentration in one
market rather than through predatory pricing. Thus, according to
Rose-Ackerman, the UBIT provisions are not the proper response to
the potential of an unfair competitive advantage and, therefore,
should be repealed.216
Professor William Klein raises economic arguments similar to those
of Rose-Ackerman.2 17 Klein adds to these arguments his general
skepticism that nonprofits would choose to expand with surplus retained earnings rather than apply the profits to charitable purposes. 1 8
Klein points out that fears of unfair competition are based on a series
of assumptions concerning behavior of nonprofits in the market place,
such as the inclination of nonprofits to undersell. 21 9 Klein concludes
that "fears expressed by competitors are paranoid rather than rational
[and] the persistence of the myth of unfair competition, even among
intelligent, unbiased experts, may suggest that sound economic analysis is simply beyond the capacity of the public and Congress to comprehend."1 0 Klein's observations have proven accurate; most courts
have regurgitated the unfair competition argument originally articulated in 1950 without any recourse to rigorous economic analysis.
2. The Moderate View
In contrast to the recommendations of Rose-Ackerman and Klein,
some scholars favor retaining the UBIT provisions, albeit in a modified form."2 For example, Professor Henry B. Hansmannm2 although
nod-more than three years after the last profit in the past and more than
fifteen years before the first profit in the future.
Id.
214. See id.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See i
See id.at 1039.
Klein, supra note 48, at 61-68.
See id. at 65.
See i&t
Id. at 68.
221. See, e.g., Hansmann, Unfair Competition,supra note 23, at 634-35 (advocating
that UBIT provisions be retained because they encourage diversity in investment).
222. Harris Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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also very critical of the unfair competition argument, suggests that
UBIT be retained for other reasons, such as the incentive UBIT provides for nonprofits to diversify their investments.
The UBIT provisions encourage diversification in two ways. First,
they encourage a nonprofit in one market to reinvest its profits in another market, rather than to expand indefinitely in the first market.
Second, because there is no longer any tax advantage to wholly owning a company, UBIT encourages nonprofits to spread their investments over a larger number of markets. Diversification is generally
thought to be a safer investment strategy than concentrating investments in one market. If a corporation concentrates its investments in
a single industry and that industry suffers from economic factors beyond the control of the corporation, the corporation could lose more
than if it had spread its investments over diverse industries.23
Like other law and economics scholars, Hansmann suggests that
fears of unfair competition are unfounded.z' 4 Hansmann argues that
tax exemption provides no incentive for nonprofits to engage in pricecutting activities. 21 5 A nonprofit takes better advantage of its tax-exempt status by maximizing the price-cost difference in a particular industry. 26 If a nonprofit undersells its competitors, it has a smaller
profit margin and does not take full advantage of its tax-exempt
status. 7
Suppose an exempt organization sells a product in market A at the
average market price of $5 and the cost of production is $4. The exempt organization retains a profit of $1. If, on the other hand, it chose
to undersell its competitors by selling its product at $4.50, it would
only retain a profit of $.50. Presumably, if the exempt organization
can offer product A at a lower price, it will attract a larger share of the
market. Once the organization gains wider control of the consumers
in market A, this larger market share will compensate for the smaller
profit margin created by lowering its price. A nonprofit is not likely,
however, to sacrifice the current opportunity to achieve a higher22profit
8
margin for the promise of a larger market share in the future.
The organization could choose instead to reinvest the profits from
market A in market B, leaving both the price and profit margin in
market A intact. According to Hansmann, tax exemption encourages
223. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 613-20. This argument
overlooks the possibility, however, of repealing UBIT in part but maintaining a prohibition against feeder organizations.
224. See id. at 609.
225. Id. at 609-12. But see Bennett, supra note 4, at 760 ("Research has shown that
nonprofits have used these economic advantages to underprice their for-profit counterparts." citation omitted)).
226. Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 611.
227. See id
228. See supra note 164.
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a nonprofit to pursue the latter course. 229 Reinvesting its profits in
another market lessens the organization's need to hold a greater share
of market A to compensate for a smaller profit margin. Therefore, a
nonprofit would have no incentive to drive competitors out of a market through underselling.3 0 Contrary to Rose-Ackerman's theory,
Hansmann's theory suggests that UBIT creates an incentive to diversify rather than to concentrate investments in one market.231
The NYU-Mueller scenario appears to substantiate Hansmann's
theory of nonprofit market behavior 32 There is no evidence that
Mueller undersold Ronzoni, a prominent competitor in the macaroni
market.33 Furthermore, apparently aware of the advantages of tax
exemption, NYU chose to invest in diverse companies manufacturing
such items as chinaware and piston rings, rather than concentrating its
investments in macaroni.3 4 Thus, the competitive advantage allegedly created through tax exemption did not in fact harm NYU's forprofit competitors, but instead encouraged NYU to follow more prudent investment strategies, spreading its risks over diverse markets.
Hansmann suggests that the unfair aspect of the current regime is
not necessarily the competitive advantage exemption supposedly creates, but rather the inconsistent tax treatment of nonprofits under
UBIT.?3 Even assuming nonprofits will use exemption to undersell
for-profit competitors within a market, this need not pose a threat to a
for-profit. If a for-profit firm can anticipate competition from a nonprofit in a particular market, it can decide, before committing its resources, to enter another market in which it could make a profit. 1
Under the current UBIT provisions, however, it is not always clear
when a nonprofit will be subject to tax and when it will not. Thus, forprofits cannot anticipate which markets nonprofits will choose to
enter. Hansmann suggests that unfair competition occurs when forprofit firms suffer such unforeseeable losses.3 7 Therefore, "problems
of unfair competition generally arise only in transitions from one tax
regime to another because that is usually the only time at which sub229. See Hansmann, supra note 23, at 611 ("[T]he nonprofit leaves undisturbed the
price that prevails when only for-profit firms compete, and thereby maximizes the
difference between cost and sales price.")
230. Idt at 612.
231. See id at 609-12.

232. See Comment, supra note 164, at 851-2; see also Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 615 n.33; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1017 n.2.
233. One student unearthed records of NYU's profits before and after the acquisi-

tion of Mueller macaroni, but did not produce any evidence of below-cost pricing. See
Comment, supra note 164, at 863 n.57.
234. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1017 n.2.
235. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 613-14.
236. Even if UBIT were repealed, therefore, a for-profit would on average attain a
higher rate of return as long as it could adjust its expectations to protect itself against
the possibility of competition from nonprofits. See idt at 609-13.
237. See id at 613.

1730

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

stantial unforeseeable tax-induced losses can arise." 8 Rather than
urging repeal, Hansmann advocates consistency in the application of
the current UBIT provisions, thus retaining an incentive for diversification of nonprofit investments. 239
Moreover, Hansmann discerns values of UBIT other than diversification of investment. For example, he suggests that the UBIT provisions prevent nonprofits from straying too far from their tax-exempt
purposes.24 ° The further a nonprofit entity strays from activities related to its exempt purpose, the more it will be taxed. Thus, UBIT
functions as a check on the activities of nonprofits, fostering both accountability and dependency on public support for the furtherance of
their activities.
Accountability is even more significant than Hansmann suggests. If
the incentive for a nonprofit to engage in unrelated activities is limited, the nonprofit is forced to rely on contributions. Soliciting contributions serves a dual purpose of generating revenue and encouraging
society to contemplate the value of the services of the exempt organization. An exempt organization's inability to muster minimal support
through charitable donations may indicate that society no longer values the services of the exempt organization. If society no longer
places a high priority on these services, then perhaps the tax-exempt
status of the organization is no longer justified. Although complete
dependency on public support may not be a realistic market goal, exempt organizations should be encouraged to maximize their dependence on public support. If an exempt organization were allowed to
derive as much income as it chose from unrelated activities, it would
have little incentive to solicit contributions from society.24 1
According to Hansmann, even if the advantages of the current
UBIT provisions would not alone have been enough to motivate its
original enactment, repealing the provisions would trigger additional
difficulties.242 In the absence of the UBIT provisions, for example,
nonprofits would have an incentive to own entire companies, just as
before 1950.243 This could represent a large loss of tax revenue for the
government. Under pre-UBIT law, a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary would have been considered an unrelated exempt business and
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 613.
See id. at 620-21.
Id. at 621; see also Copeland, supra note 149, at 918.
Critics of public television arguing against continued federal subsidization of

WNET have advanced a similar argument. They suggest that oversubsidization
quashes an organization's incentive to fund itself: "'WNET doesn't need a dime of
federal funding .... They have gotten so fat sucking on the Federal teat that they

can't function like normal people. Well, it's time to put them on a diet.'" Bill Carter,
WNET Braces for Cuts or Worse, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1995, at C13 (quoting Lawrence
Jarvik, a fellow at the Center for Popular Culture).
242. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 618-23.
243. See id. at 622.
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would not be subject to taxation on its profits. ' Thus, owning an
entire company as opposed to a small percentage would maximize a
nonprofit's advantage. NYU apparently maximized its advantage of
tax exemption in precisely this manner. NYU chose the option of
wholly owning a few companies instead of owning a small percentage
of a larger number of companies."s NYU chose to invest in companies outside of the macaroni market, thus leaving the prices in the
macaroni market intact and maximizing its profit margin in the macaroni market. Because there is no longer any advantage to wholly owning a for-profit,' exempt organizations have an incentive to diversify
their investment resources. The same profits that would have been
used to purchase an entire company are now used to invest in several
different companies and industries.
Hansmann's explanation of how UBIT encourages diversification of
investment and fosters accountability offers a cogent reason to retain
UBIT. Despite the insightful criticisms raised by Hansmann, RoseAckerman and Klein, the academic debate surrounding the UBIT
provisions generally has done little to inform the congressional commentary over the continued viability of the UBIT rationale.247
3. Measuring Unfair Competition
Scholars have raised valuable criticisms of the widespread belief
that unfair competition is a legitimate rationale for the UBIT provisions. 4 Nonetheless, no one has provided a thorough empirical study
of the impact of tax exemption on competition between for-profits
and nonprofits. To date, only a few studies have been undertaken.249
The lack of empirical evidence does not mean, however, that complaints of unfair competition should simply be dismissed. It may be
that the impact of tax exemption cannot be known with certainty be244. Under our current system of taxation, a tax is imposed on a corporation when
it earns income and again on a shareholder when the corporation distributes a dividend to its shareholders. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301 (1995); Boris I. Bittker & James S.
Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 1-8 to 1-9 (6th
ed. 1994).

245. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1017 n.2. Apparently, the Sagrada
Orden pursued the same investment strategy. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de
Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). Had this practice continued, it could have resulted
in a shrinkage in the U.S. tax base, because of the large number of for-profits wholly
owned by exempt organizations. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at

621-24 (discussing tax base shrinkage).
246. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13); see also Tax-Exempt Organizations: Organization, Operation and Reporting Requirements, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 464-3rd, at A-130 (July

13, 1992).
247. Proposals set forth by Treasury officers will be discussed in part IV, infra.
248. See supra part M.B.1-B.2.
249. See James T. Bennett & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Unfair Competition: The Profits of Nonprofits (1989); Harrison Wellford & Janne Gallagher, The Myth of Unfair

Competition by Nonprofit Organizations (1985).
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cause of the numerous variables affecting nonprofit behavior in the
market place.250
Litigants attempting to base claims on an alleged competitive advantage, 52
for example, have failed."' In Structure Probe,Inc. v. Franklin Inst., plaintiff Structure Probe, a for-profit corporation, brought
suit against a tax-exempt organization, The Franklin Institute, under
the Sherman Antitrust Act. 3 Structure Probe claimed that the
Franklin Institute attempted to monopolize a local market for Scanning Electron Microscope services.' 4 The plaintiff was unable to
prove a sufficient market share to sustain an antitrust claim under 15
U.S.C. § 2, because, as the court observed, "[B]elow-cost
price alone
' 5
is not sufficient to prove predatory pricing.' 1
Structure Probe demonstrates the difficulty of substantiating a claim
of unfair competition by a nonprofit. Measuring claims of unfair competition with an antitrust measuring stick may not be the best approach to assessing unfair competition by nonprofits.- 6 A company's
competitive behavior may be unfair without rising to the level of an
antitrust violation. Thus, the antitrust standard may be too high a
threshold by which to judge competitive effects. The antitrust analysis
does have the advantage, however, of being more developed than
other means of measuring competition. 57
250. See UBIT Recommendations, supra note 27, at L-15 ("The damage of unfair
competition is difficult to assess because the problem is national in scope but local in
impact." (Testimony of Joseph O'Neil, Chairman, Business Coalition for Fair Competition, June 22, 1987)).
251. See American Soc'y of Travel Agents v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (association of travel agents bringing action against Secretary of Treasury for
failure of federal tax authorities to assess tax on income received by certain exempt
organizations); Structure Probe, Inc. v. Franklin Inst., 450 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
252. 450 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
253. See id. at 1274.
254. See id.
255. Id at 1288 (citation omitted).
256. Other approaches to addressing the alleged competitive advantage have been
pursued, but without success. In American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), plaintiff attempted to sue federal tax authorities
based on their failure to assess taxes upon income received by the American Jewish
Congress. Id. at 147. In dismissing the complaint for lack of standing, the District of
Columbia Circuit followed Justice Stewart's concurrence in Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., et al., in which he observed that he could not "imagine a case, at least
outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not
affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else."
American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc, 566 F.2d at 147 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1975)).
257. No adequate means of monitoring a nonprofit's effect on competition has yet
been developed. The Federal Trade Commission, responsible for enforcing the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, does not
have jurisdiction over most nonprofits because the Act defines "corporation" narrowly "as a for-profit entity or trade association representing for-profit entities." Bennett, supra note 4, at 760.
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Perhaps a competitive advantage may exist in limited circumstances. Before developing a viable solution to the present problems
with the UBIT provisions, Congress and the Service should consolidate their efforts through a comprehensive study of the impact of tax
exemption on the competition between nonprofits and for-profits 58s
Because no adequate study has yet been undertaken,25 9 it is impossible to determine whether the unfair competition rationale should influence the development of an alternative rationale for UBIT. Until
an adequate study has been accomplished, diversification of investment and accountability of nonprofits to the public offer better justifications for UBIT. Without a clearly articulated rationale, the current
terms used in UBIT and its modifications cannot properly be defined
as functions of an underlying rationale. Furthermore, without a
clearer expression of the justification for UBIT, it will be in possible
to achieve any consistency in its application.
IV. THE UBIT OF ToMoRRoW

Legal scholars have urged that unfair competition is not the best
rationale for the UBIT provisions.6 ° The Service and the courts have
paid lip service to the rationale but have not applied UBIT with a
view to furthering this purpose. 61 Since 1987, the need to revise and
amend the UBIT provisions has become apparent.6 - UBIT is in need
of a fundamental overhaul, beginning with the underlying rationale
258. See Spitzer, supra note 15, at 199 ("Congress should work with the Internal
Revenue Service and other interested parties to develop Forms 990 and 990T that will
elicit helpful information that can be compiled in a systematic manner.. . .") Even if,
in certain cases, a competitive advantage is found to exist, it is not clear when this
advantage is, in fact, "unfair."
259. In reviewing the Oversight Committee's draft report on UBIT reform, Thomas
Troyer remarked that the proposals advanced for reform were "based upon limited,
imperfect, and in many ways idiosyncratic information about the world for which it
would establish law." Troyer, supra note 15, at 1227; see also Bittker & Rahdert, supra
note 3, at 319 ("These predictions of unfair competition were rarely subjected to close
analysis, and we know of no empirical examination of the results of such
acquisitions.").
In 1990, the Service initiated a study, the results of which are still being assessed.
See Advice for Exempt Organizations: Stay Alert Stay Alive, Tax Notes Today 111-10,
May 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
260. See supra part I.
261. See supra part II. See also Streckfus, supra note 16 ("The original intent of
the UBIT provisions, as first enacted, has long since been lost.").
262. See generally Marlis L. Carson, Exempt OrganizationsStill Waiting for Significant Guidance,Tax Notes Today 2-7, Jan. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File (noting that there is an "extreme lack of 'precedential' guidance in the [exempt organizations] area" and citing the application of the royalty exception as an
area of uncertainty); Copeland, supra note 201, at 919; Copeland & Rudney, supra
note 6, at 750-55; Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 635-35; Spitzer,
supra note 15, at 196; Troyer, supra note 15, at 1222; Wirtschafter, supra note 23, at
1467-68.
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for UBIT and extending to the exceptions to UBIT.263 Several proposals have been made to change the current UBIT provisions and
cure the fatal inconsistencies in their application. This part concludes
that the principle of accountability, whereby nonprofits are compelled
to justify the use they make of the subsidy of tax exemption, offers a
more practicable rationale for the taxation of nonprofits' unrelated
business activities than does the unfair competition rationale. Under
the principle of accountability, when a nonprofit does not use its subsidy to further an exempt purpose, it should be made to account for
the misuse of the subsidy by paying a tax. This rationale should be
implemented to guide the application of UBIT and define the scope of
the royalty exception.
A. Reviving Concerns of Unfair Competition
The rulings and opinions discussed above underline the discord between the original rationale for UBIT and the manner in which it is
currently being applied. Although a commerciality standard has been
rejected repeatedly by courts, 264 efforts have been made to revive the
unfair competition rationale for UBIT through a commerciality
test.265 Under this test, those "inherently commercial" ventures undertaken by exempt organizations would be taxed.2 66 This standard is
nothing more than a modem expression of concerns over unfair competition. Furthermore, the proposal overlooks the legitimate criticisms that have been raised with respect to the unfair competition
rationale. As yet, there is no consensus that tax exemption is unfair to
for-profits. 267 Also, the proposal fails to specify how "commerciality"
is to be defined. Commerciality could be determined by the motive of
the nonprofit or by the impact of the activity on the market. Nor does
the proposed test explain why organizations should be taxed on "inherently commercial" ventures if the proceeds are used to further
charitable purposes. Critics of the unfair competition rationale have
struggled with these questions for decades. Until these questions can
be answered any commerciality standard must fall.
263. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 4, at 759 ("Nearly four decades of experience
with this law.., have shown the UBIT to be ineffectual in eliminating or even substantially reducing unfair competition... Congress is so lost in the UBIT trees that it
cannot find the forest."); see also UBIT Update: The View from the Hill, 2 The Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 142 (1989) (reviewing legislative proposals to change UBIT).

264. See Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 538-42 (5th
Cir. 1982); Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Etc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 270, 272-74

(8th Cir. 1978).
265. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 764; James Bennett & Gabriel Rudney, A Com-

merciality Test to Resolve the CommercialNonprofit Issue, 36 Tax Notes 1095, 1095-98
(1987); Troyer, supra note 15, at 1222.

266. See Troyer, supra note 15, at 1222.
267. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 760; Copeland & Rudney, supra note 6, at 749.
But see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 3, at 319-20; Klein, supra note 48, at 68.
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Even if one could prove that tax exemption is unfair to for-profits,
there may be better ways to address this problem.'
One option
would be to tax an exempt organization on income earned through
attempts to use its advantage unfairly. For example, a tax could be
imposed on that revenue generated through price-cutting. It would be
difficult, however, to arrive at a definition of price-cutting that both
allows for market fluctuation and does not exert too much control
over a nonprofit's attempt to compete within a market. In any event,
as long as scholars and practitioners disagree over whether exemption
creates an unfair advantage, the elimination of unfair competition will
remain an impracticable objective for UBIT. If exemption creates no
unfair advantage, then UBIT cannot and should not be implemented
or interpreted to eliminate unfair competition. Instead, an alternative
rationale must be developed to guide the application of the UBIT
provisions.
B.

The Economic Efficiency Rationale

Economic efficiency has also been proposed as an alternative rationale for UBIT.269 According to this rationale, the government
should allow tax exemption only where the income derives from an
activity performed more efficiently by an exempt organization than by
a for-profit.27 Under this standard, the government would not allow
any exemption where the goods or services provided "are the same as
and adequately supplied by for-profit businesses.""27 A museum's reproduction of paintings in its collection is one example of the efficient
function of a nonprofit.2' When a museum licenses a for-profit to
make and market reproductions of pieces from the museum, the proceeds generated by the license should be exempt. Because of the capital outlay required to make original art works available for viewing,
once the collection is already in existence, reproducing the works "is
not an activity that a for-profit firm could perform instead ....
[E]xempting such profits produces a subsidy that is neatly proportioned to the publicly valuable service that the museum provides,
268. As Rose-Ackerman has suggested, this would require a refinement of the notion of market "fairness." See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1020-21.
269. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition,supra note 23, at 626-33; Ubit Recommendations, supra note 27, app. C (Testimony of Hon. 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy
Assistant Secretary (Tax policy), Department of the Treasury, before the Subconm.
on Oversight, Comm. on Ways and Means (May 9, 1988)).
270. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 613-17.
271. Troyer, supra note 15, at 1227; Copeland, supra note 201, at 916 ("Thus, tax
exemption for public charities should be restricted to those areas where the quality or
quantity of goods and services that would be produced strictly through market forces
is inadequate.") (Testimony of Hon. 0. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax policy), Department of the Treasury, before the Subcomm. on Oversight,
Comm. on Ways and Means (June 22, 1987)).
272. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 629-34.
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which2 73is acquiring expensive art works for display at low or no
fees.

Unfortunately, this scenario does not help resolve the difficult questions raised by a nonprofit's licensing of its name or logo to endorse
an affinity credit card. When it endorses an affinity credit card, a nonprofit is not necessarily performing a function that a for-profit could
not perform. Its function can only be considered peculiar to its status
in that the bank sponsoring the credit card may attract more subscribers because subscribers realize that through purchases made with the
274
card, they make an indirect donation to the nonprofit involved.
Consider, for example, how Columbia University advertises its affinity
card:
You are, no doubt, deluged with credit card offers. So how do you
choose which one to carry? The Columbia Visa Card makes that
choice very simple. A portion of every charge you make with this
card will go toward financial aid for Columbia students. At absolutely no additional cost to you. And there's no annual fee. 275
When a nonprofit endorsement of a credit card is compared with an
airline's endorsement of a credit card, the role of the for-profit is
clearly different. When a consumer subscribes to a credit card endorsed by an airline, the consumer chooses the services of both companies. The consumer does not choose the joint arrangement because
he wishes to make an indirect contribution to the airline. The consumer chooses it to build up frequent flier miles. From this perspective, there is no for-profit parallel to an exempt organization's
endorsement of an affinity credit card.
273. Id. at 631. Professor Hansmann explains that while for-profits may provide
the same charitable services, it may be difficult for purchasers of such services, or
charitable donors, to judge the quality of the same service when provided by a forprofit organization. As a result of this uncertainty, "ordinary market competition
may be insufficient to police the performance of for profit firms, thus leaving them
free to charge excessive prices for inferior service." Consequently, "consumers often
turn to nonprofit providers, which, owing to the nondistribution constraint, have less
opportunity and incentive to exploit consumers than do for-profit firms, and thus
serve as fiduciaries of a sort for their consumers." Hansmann, Rationalefor Exemption, supra note 3, at 69. Reliance on a nonprofit, however, does not completely eliminate the risk of funds being siphoned off by higher compensation for executives.
274. An affinity card endorsement should be distinguished from a practice often
referred to as "cause related funding." The Ways and Means Subcommittee explains
the distinction in the following manner.
Under this practice, charitable contributions . . . are made by a business
which merely has informed the public that an amount will be donated to the
charity based on the sales of its products or use of its services, and has not
entered into a contractual arrangement with the charity under which the
business receives any consideration from the charity (such as the exclusive
right to use the charity's name or logo on a particular type of product).
See UBIT Recommendations, supra note 27, at L-21.
275. Columbia: The Magazine of Columbia University, Fall 1994, back cover page.
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According to the efficiency rationale, when there is no for-profit
parallel, the nonprofit performs this endorsement function more efficiently. If the nonprofit is the more efficient provider, the income
generated therefrom should be exempt. It would follow that all income derived from all affinity card arrangements endorsed by nonprofits should be exempt from taxation. Many might be
uncomfortable with this result, however, if the nonprofit had become
a joint venturer with a bank and actively marketed credit cards. This
would permit a nonprofit to maintain its exempt status despite an aggressive foray into a business unrelated to its exempt purpose. Thus,
the efficiency rationale is inadequate, because it does not distinguish
between nonprofits whose level of participation and control differ
widely. The efficiency rationale may be more reasonably grounded in
economic reality than is the unfair competition rationale and is well
adapted to explain the taxation of certain arrangements, such as museum gift shops. It does not, however, answer questions raised by
other nonprofit unrelated activities. Thus, economic efficiency may
not provide an underlying rationale broad enough in scope to guide
the application of UBIT.
C.

The Accountability Rationale

The imposition of a tax on unrelated business activity of nonprofits
may
provide a means of holding the nonprofit accountable to the public.276 To the extent that a nonprofit engages in activities unrelated to
its exempt purpose, it violates its agreement with the public to undertake activities related to its exempt purpose in exchange for exemption from taxation. After all, it is the public who, through the
legislature, ultimately confers the tax benefit.2'
In a for-profit corporation, shareholders have an incentive to monitor the policies and decisions of the directors and officers of the corporation through the shareholder voting process. Because shareholders
of a nonprofit corporation may not receive any portion of the earnings
and profits of the corporation in the form of dividends, however, no
such analogous policing incentive exists. In fact, prior to 1950, the
only check on a nonprofit's expansion into unrelated activities was the
threat of complete revocation of its exempt status. There was no intermediate measure to ensure that a nonprofit was using its subsidy to
further an exempt purpose. Although revocation is still a potential
penalty under current law, UBIT offers the opportunity for an inter276. See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 149, at 917; Hansmann, Unfair Competition,
supra note 23, at 629.

277. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 621 ("Subsidies for nonprofits should be structured to encourage them to expand their related, not their unrelated, activities."); see also Copeland, supra note 149, at 917 ("[R~ules limiting the
scope of tax exemption may appropriately encourage the exempt organization to concentrate on activities and investments that do not distract from its exempt function.")
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mediate check on the nonprofit. UBIT deters a nonprofit from straying too far from its exempt purpose; as long as a nonprofit will be
taxed as a for-profit when the nonprofit engages in unrelated activities, the incentive to expand into unrelated activities is significantly
diminished. Thus, by taxing a nonprofit on its income generated
through unrelated activities, UBIT holds a nonprofit accountable to
the public that has granted the nonprofit exempt status.
Among the underlying rationales proposed thus far, accountability
offers the soundest and most practical guiding principle for determining the taxation of unrelated business income. Accountability is particularly important, because, generally, exempt organizations are less
accountable than for-profits.2 78 With respect to for-profit organizations, "[c]ompetitive pressures in product markets, labor markets, and
markets for managerial control assure consumers that businesses will
be reasonably responsive."279 Exempt organizations, because of the
accumulation of tax privileges, are more isolated from these competitive pressures, and therefore, exempt organizations are less accountable to the public? 0
More government supervision may be necessary to ensure that the
grant of tax exemption is fulfilling public goals.28 ' Thus, "rules limiting the scope of tax exemption may appropriately encourage the exempt organization to concentrate on activities and investments that do
not distract from its exempt function."'
This supervision could be
implemented by levying a tax when the nonprofit fails to expend for
exempt purposes, or by setting aside at least five percent of the assets
gained through unrelated activities for exempt purposes to be pursued
in the future.3 The function of the penalty may be expressed in simple terms: "[S]ince society granted exemption of the income, society
should get a minimum return in the form of social welfare expenditures for the tax given up. '284 While the penalty would encourage
accountability, to administer the penalty the Service would have to
police the activities of nonprofits more strictly. The Service could, for
278. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 763.
279. Id
280. See id One could argue, however, that exempt organizations should be immune from these competitive pressures. Extending this reasoning one step further,
perhaps exempt organizations should not be held strictly accountable to the public,
because if they are, people might choose not to subsidize charitable activities.
Whether the public should be allowed to choose on its own what is best for society
depends upon whether one endorses a paternalistic notion of government. See David
L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism,74 Va. L. Rev. 519, 521 (1988) (dis-

cussing the problematic nature of paternalism as a guide for legislatures and courts);
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 Harv.L. Rev. 1849, 1898-99 (1987)
(explaining that a paternalistic notion of government assumes that freedom is "negative liberty" and thus individuals do not know what is best for themselves).
281. See Copeland, supra note 149, at 918.
282. Id at 917.
283. Id at 919.
284. Id
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example, require nonprofits to file more comprehensive returns than
are presently required, detailing the sources of their income regardless
of whether they have earned unrelated business income in the past.
Thus, accountability may provide an objective to guide the application
of UBIT as well as an opportunity to gather information on the behavior of nonprofits.
D. Implementing the Accountability Rationale
While accountability may offer a promising rationale for UBIT, the
specific contours of the rules that would have to be developed in accordance with this rationale have yet to be delineated. To hold a nonprofit accountable for the benefit of tax exemption is to ensure that
this benefit is being used to further the exempt purpose that originally
justified the nonprofit's exemption. The specific consequences that
would flow from an accountability rationale remain unclear, but it is
arguable that there should be no per se exemption from taxation for
royalty income. Instead, the royalty exception should be revised to
exempt only royalties arising from certain types of transactions. The
royalty provision should be amended to permit taxation of impermissible royalties regardless of whether the nonprofit is considered to be
engaged in a trade or business. 8
Accountability would suggest, for example, that the royalties the
Sierra Club derives from its endorsement of an affinity credit card
should be subject to taxation. An exempt organization would escape
accountability if it were allowed to build up goodwill through the benefit of tax exemption, license this goodwill through the rental of its
name and logo to a for-profit organization and still retain the proceeds
free of any tax. As a nonprofit organization builds its reputation and
goodwill, it is assisted by the higher profit margin that tax exemption
provides. Not until a nonprofit has achieved a certain level of recognition as a charitable provider does its name or logo become marketable
as a for-profit endorsement vehicle. Thus, having built a solid reputation through the help of tax exemption, an exempt organization exploits the privilege conferred upon it by the public when it licenses its
name or logo to a for-profit instead of using this advantage to further
an exempt purpose.3 In other words, it has taken its subsidy and
285. Typically a court finds first that the nonprofit is engaged in an unrelated trade
or business and then considers whether the proceeds are exempt under the royalty
exception of 512(b)(2). See, e.g., Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693
F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1982) (determining first whether income derived from an unrelated
trade or business and, second, whether proceeds could be characterized as royalty
income). In Sierra Club II, however, the Tax Court reversed this analysis by finding
that the Sierra Club was not engaged in a trade or business, because the proceeds it
received constituted royalties. Sierra Club II, No. 8650-91, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS
62, *2.
286. Copeland seems to suggest this when he observes that "consideration should
be given to excluding from the definition of a royalty, situations where an exempt
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licensed it to a for-profit organization that uses the subsidy to further
a purpose for which the subsidy was not originally intended. If a nonprofit is to be held accountable for its subsidy, it should be permitted
to use this subsidy only to further its exempt purpose and should not
be allowed to redistribute the subsidy, tax-free, to for-profit organizations through the license of its name and logo."8
The royalty that the licensing of a name and logo generates is one
type of royalty payment. The royalty payment arises out of the rental
of an asset created by the nonprofit with the aid of the government
subsidy that tax-exemption provides. Compare the type of royalty
generated by a self-created asset with the type of royalty arising from
the donation of intangible property to a nonprofit. Suppose a third
party donates to a nonprofit a patent, which is then licensed to another entity. If the nonprofit receives royalty payments for the use of
the patent, this would not violate any principle of accountability. Presumably when the donor makes a contribution, the donor has already
determined that the manner in which the 2nonprofit is operated warrants a contribution to support the entity.

88

organization is exploiting goodwill and other intangibles generated by its exempt purposes." Copeland, supra note 149, at 915 (citing O.D. Chapoton, Deputy Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy), Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on
Ways and Means, June 22, 1987 and May 8, 1988); see also UBIT Recommendations,
supra note 27, at L-22 (suggesting that income derived from the licensing of a nonprofit's property should be subject to UBIT if the tax-exempt organization created
the property right being licensed).
The nature of a nonprofit's goodwill may provide an even stronger argument for
taxing these proceeds. Ifas some commentators have suggested, the goodwill of a
successful exempt organization is qualitatively different than that of a successful forprofit, then the licensing of its name and logo may appear abusive. See Bennett, supra
note 4, at 760 ("[E]ven if we put aside possible tax advantages, the nonprofit entity
has an unfair advantage... owing to the public image of nonprofit status." (citing
Marc Lane, Legal Handbook for Nonprofit Organizations 273 (1980) (emphasis added))); see also UBIT Update: The View from the Hill, 2 The Exempt Org. Tax Rev.
142 (1989) ("If you've got that halo and you can go out and raise money through
contributions or donations, tax-free and tax-deductible, and take that same money
and use it to compete with a tax-paying subsidiary, then you've got a great advantage
over that tax-paying subsidiary.").
287. Not every license of a self-created asset, however, would violate the principle
of accountability. For example, where the license of an intangible asset remains related to the nonprofit's purpose, the royalties generated therefrom should remain exempt. Suppose the Sierra Club produced a book on endangered species in North
America. If the Sierra Club obtained a copyright and then licensed this copyright to a
for-profit publisher, the royalty payments made by the for-profit publisher to the Sierra Club should be exempt, because the asset and the licensing of the copyright for
the asset are related to the Sierra Club's exempt purpose. The licensing of the Sierra
Club's name and logo to endorse a credit card, however, is not related to its exempt
purpose.
288. Suppose, however, the magnitude of the donation is significantly greater. Suppose, for example, instead of donating a copyright, a donor donates several copyrights. When the contribution reaches this magnitude, the nonprofit will be forced to
use its personnel or even hire new personnel to manage the income-producing intangible property. It is questionable whether, once the nonprofit's role in the generation
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No such opportunity to evaluate the operation of a nonprofit exists
where a tax-exempt entity licenses a self-created asset for a use that is
not related to its exempt purpose. Unless the nonprofit alters its underlying purpose or manner of operation, it will continue to receive
the benefit of tax exemption. Also, although the Service may revoke
a nonprofit's exempt status under some circumstances, there is no opportunity to continually assess the value of the nonprofit's role in society. In other words, once an entity has qualified for tax exemption,
exemption itself provides a continuing subsidy without the same periodic determination of whether the subsidy is still justified.
Yet another type of royalty would arise if a nonprofit purchased an
intangible instead of receiving it as a gift or creating it itself. Suppose
a nonprofit purchased a copyright to a book. If the royalties generated through the sales of the book required little effort or involvement
on behalf of the nonprofit, then it may be appropriate to exempt these
royalties from taxation. The level of participation of the nonprofit is
not the only factor in determining whether the royalties should be exempt or not. It is also critical to ascertain from where the proceeds to
purchase the copyright came in the first place. Although direct tracing of funds would be too problematic a method to implement this
rationale, accountability does require focus both on the initial investment in the royalty-producing property and on the manner in which
the royalty-producing property is managed. If, for example, the nonprofit uses a significant percentage of its accumulated profits to
purchase the copyright, then it is more likely that the nonprofit is misusing the higher profit margin it has benefitted from because of tax
exemption. The royalty derived from the purchase of intangible property, therefore, is similar to the royalty derived from the self-created
intangible asset, and both should be subject to tax. Only the royalty
proceeds derived from the donation of intangible property to the nonprofit should be exempt from taxation. Distinguishing among self-created, purchased and donated royalties is one way to implement the
accountability rationale.
Another way to implement the accountability rationale would be to
establish a ceiling for the percentage of a nonprofit's income that may
be derived from unrelated business activities. A percentage based on
income may not be entirely appropriate, because income alone does
not take into account the different expenses that different nonprofits
may incur. A more useful measure might be established by comparing
the relationship of a nonprofit's unrelated income to either its assets
base, gross receipts, equity or some combination of the preceding.
A percentage limit would serve as a check on an exempt organization that begins to stray too far from its exempt purpose. This soluof the income has become this significant, the royalty payments should still be entirely
exempt. Perhaps an upward limit on the amount of a nonprofit's income from royalty
payments from unrelated activities could be established.
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tion also would avoid the difficulty of administration present in other
proposals. If all exempt organizations were required to fill out more
comprehensive forms documenting the sources of their income, then
the Service would have both valuable data about exempt organizations' investment activities and a simple way to apply the percentage
test. Once the percentage limit is determined, the value of this rule is
apparent; the test can be applied mechanically. The Service need only
make a straightforward mathematical determination.
Exactly how this percentage limit should be established is a more
problematic question. The arbitrariness of any set percentage could
be minimized by establishing industry-by-industry profit percentage
ceilings. For each industry, at least two preliminary determinations
would have to be made: (1) the potential amount of support the organization could get from the public if it were operated efficiently; and
(2) the ceiling on the percentage of income from unrelated business
activities that would compel an exempt organization to maximize its
dependence on public support. Implementing a percentage limit
would require more in depth knowledge of nonprofit behavior than is
currently available. Nonetheless, a percentage limit could eventually
eliminate some of the difficult, and perhaps insurmountable, interpretive questions raised by the current UBIT regime.
Finally, another means of implementing the accountability rationale
would be to revive the principle of the pre-1950 "destination of income" test yet retain the substantially related test, as guided by the
principle of accountability. The "destination of income" test has often
been posited as the antithesis of the current UBIT provisions, when in
fact the two may coexist. Focussing on the use to which an exempt
organization's income is put, rather than focussing exclusively on the
effect of its activities on the market, responds directly to concerns of
accountability. Even if an exempt organization derives almost all of
its income from related activities, the organization does not fulfill its
promise to the public to further an exempt purpose if this income is
not applied properly. The Service continues to use this test to determine an organization's eligibility for the underlying exemption. 289 It
may therefore be logical to extend this rule to determine the taxation
of income generated through unrelated activities. Under section
501(c)(3), for example, an organization must be operated "exclusively" for exempt purposes to qualify for tax exemption. 29 In addition, this section prohibits private inurement.291 Under the regulation
corresponding to section 501(c)(3), an organization may operate a
trade or business as part of its activities so long as such trade or busi289. See Ellen P. Aprill, Lessons from the UBIT Debate, 45 Tax Notes 1105, 1107
(1989).
290. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(1995).
291. See id § 501(c)(3) (stating that no part of the net earnings of the nonprofit
may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual).
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ness furthers an exempt purpose.2" To determine whether the trade
or business furthers an exempt purpose, the Service generally examines how the funds generated by the trade are used.2 9 This examination of the use of an organization's funds should be extended to the
use of an organization's unrelated funds.
Congress has already considered expanding its focus on the use of
funds for the purpose of determining the underlying exemption of a
nonprofit. For example, in 1993 the Oversight Subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee explored proposals to impose
stricter regulation of public charities. 294 One of the proposals set forth
required sanctions, short of revocation of exemption, for the excessive
compensation of nonprofit executives. 295 Similarly, the attention on
the reform of UBIT should be focussed on the use of a nonprofit's
funds as well as the source of its funds. For too long commentators
have focussed only on how nonprofits derive their funds; yet they
have overlooked an equally important issue, where these funds are
destined. For example, only one of the commentators who have written about NYU's macaroni monopoly has discussed or documented
where the macaroni profits went.296 Furthermore, no one has proven
that Ronzoni suffered from NYU's foray into the macaroni market.2 97
Only the derivation of these funds has been discussed. Absent a finding of adverse impact on NYU's competitors, perhaps the legislature
should have responded to the alleged macaroni monopoly by refining
and expanding the destination of income test.
CONCLUSION

The unfair competition rationale has proven to be an impracticable
guiding principle for the imposition of UBIT and its royalty exception.
The need to establish a workable rationale for the UBIT provisions
will only increase with time. If an expansive interpretation of the
292. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended Aug. 30, 1990).
293. See Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186; see also April, supra note 289 (explaining that to determine whether an organization qualifies for exemption from taxation
the Service relies in part on a "destination of income" analysis).
294. See Robert A. Boisture & M4ilton Cerny, Second Oversight Subcommittee
Hearing Explores Need for Intermediate Sanctions and More Disclosure,Tax Notes
Today 188-42, Sept. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS Fedtax Library, TNT File.
295. See id.
296. See Comment, supra note 164, at 863 n.57. This is not to say that a tracing rule
should be implemented. Because money is fungible, any standard should reflect what
percentage of a nonprofit's gross income the unrelated income comprises. Suppose
90% of all unrelated income were required to be applied to further exempt purposes.
Thus if a nonprofit derived 50% of its income from unrelated activities, then only five
percent of its total gross income from related and unrelated activities could be reinvested in unrelated activities.
297. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 122 n.4 (1986)
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
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royalty exception is upheld on appeal of Sierra Club ii,29s this may
create a large loophole encouraging nonprofit and for-profit organizations to disguise their proceeds from joint ventures as royalty payments. This loophole could eventually represent a large loss of tax
revenue to the Treasury.
Until Congress reforms UBIT and expresses an objective upon
which both courts and the Service can rely, it will be difficult to determine how the royalty exception should be applied to innovative unrelated activities such as affinity card endorsements. Accountability
offers a clear and rational objective for the provisions without having
to rely on economic theories over which scholars conflict and that
courts simply do not entertain. Furthermore, accountability provides
a measure by which both the derivation and destination of a nonprofits's revenue may be assessed. Accountability suggests that the public
should receive a benefit in exchange for the subsidy it has conferred
through tax exemption. UBIT and its royalty exception need to be
revised with a view to furthering the goal of accountability.

298. The Service appealed the decision on January 18, 1995. See Report on Tax
Court Cases on Appeal, Tax Notes Today 22-64, Feb. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File.

